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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ceph/armor.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/armor.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/armor.c106
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/armor.c b/net/ceph/armor.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0db806592
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/armor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+int ceph_armor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end);
+int ceph_unarmor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end);
+
+/*
+ * base64 encode/decode.
+ */
+
+static const char *pem_key =
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+static int encode_bits(int c)
+{
+ return pem_key[c];
+}
+
+static int decode_bits(char c)
+{
+ if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+ return c - 'A';
+ if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+ return c - 'a' + 26;
+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
+ return c - '0' + 52;
+ if (c == '+')
+ return 62;
+ if (c == '/')
+ return 63;
+ if (c == '=')
+ return 0; /* just non-negative, please */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int ceph_armor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end)
+{
+ int olen = 0;
+ int line = 0;
+
+ while (src < end) {
+ unsigned char a, b, c;
+
+ a = *src++;
+ *dst++ = encode_bits(a >> 2);
+ if (src < end) {
+ b = *src++;
+ *dst++ = encode_bits(((a & 3) << 4) | (b >> 4));
+ if (src < end) {
+ c = *src++;
+ *dst++ = encode_bits(((b & 15) << 2) |
+ (c >> 6));
+ *dst++ = encode_bits(c & 63);
+ } else {
+ *dst++ = encode_bits((b & 15) << 2);
+ *dst++ = '=';
+ }
+ } else {
+ *dst++ = encode_bits(((a & 3) << 4));
+ *dst++ = '=';
+ *dst++ = '=';
+ }
+ olen += 4;
+ line += 4;
+ if (line == 64) {
+ line = 0;
+ *(dst++) = '\n';
+ olen++;
+ }
+ }
+ return olen;
+}
+
+int ceph_unarmor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end)
+{
+ int olen = 0;
+
+ while (src < end) {
+ int a, b, c, d;
+
+ if (src[0] == '\n') {
+ src++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (src + 4 > end)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ a = decode_bits(src[0]);
+ b = decode_bits(src[1]);
+ c = decode_bits(src[2]);
+ d = decode_bits(src[3]);
+ if (a < 0 || b < 0 || c < 0 || d < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *dst++ = (a << 2) | (b >> 4);
+ if (src[2] == '=')
+ return olen + 1;
+ *dst++ = ((b & 15) << 4) | (c >> 2);
+ if (src[3] == '=')
+ return olen + 2;
+ *dst++ = ((c & 3) << 6) | d;
+ olen += 3;
+ src += 4;
+ }
+ return olen;
+}