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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/bluetooth/eir.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/eir.h')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/eir.h99
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.h b/net/bluetooth/eir.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9372db83f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.h
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+void eir_create(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *data);
+
+u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size);
+u8 eir_create_scan_rsp(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr);
+u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr);
+
+u8 eir_append_local_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *eir, u8 ad_len);
+u8 eir_append_appearance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *ptr, u8 ad_len);
+u8 eir_append_service_data(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u16 uuid, u8 *data,
+ u8 data_len);
+
+static inline u16 eir_precalc_len(u8 data_len)
+{
+ return sizeof(u8) * 2 + data_len;
+}
+
+static inline u16 eir_append_data(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 type,
+ u8 *data, u8 data_len)
+{
+ eir[eir_len++] = sizeof(type) + data_len;
+ eir[eir_len++] = type;
+ memcpy(&eir[eir_len], data, data_len);
+ eir_len += data_len;
+
+ return eir_len;
+}
+
+static inline u16 eir_append_le16(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 type, u16 data)
+{
+ eir[eir_len++] = sizeof(type) + sizeof(data);
+ eir[eir_len++] = type;
+ put_unaligned_le16(data, &eir[eir_len]);
+ eir_len += sizeof(data);
+
+ return eir_len;
+}
+
+static inline u16 eir_skb_put_data(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 *data, u8 data_len)
+{
+ u8 *eir;
+ u16 eir_len;
+
+ eir_len = eir_precalc_len(data_len);
+ eir = skb_put(skb, eir_len);
+ WARN_ON(sizeof(type) + data_len > U8_MAX);
+ eir[0] = sizeof(type) + data_len;
+ eir[1] = type;
+ memcpy(&eir[2], data, data_len);
+
+ return eir_len;
+}
+
+static inline void *eir_get_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u8 type,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t parsed = 0;
+
+ if (eir_len < 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ while (parsed < eir_len - 1) {
+ u8 field_len = eir[0];
+
+ if (field_len == 0)
+ break;
+
+ parsed += field_len + 1;
+
+ if (parsed > eir_len)
+ break;
+
+ if (eir[1] != type) {
+ eir += field_len + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Zero length data */
+ if (field_len == 1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (data_len)
+ *data_len = field_len - 1;
+
+ return &eir[2];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *eir_get_service_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u16 uuid, size_t *len);