diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/bluetooth/eir.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/eir.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/eir.h | 99 |
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.h b/net/bluetooth/eir.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9372db83f --- /dev/null +++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation + */ + +#include <linux/unaligned.h> + +void eir_create(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *data); + +u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size); +u8 eir_create_scan_rsp(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); +u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); + +u8 eir_append_local_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *eir, u8 ad_len); +u8 eir_append_appearance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *ptr, u8 ad_len); +u8 eir_append_service_data(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u16 uuid, u8 *data, + u8 data_len); + +static inline u16 eir_precalc_len(u8 data_len) +{ + return sizeof(u8) * 2 + data_len; +} + +static inline u16 eir_append_data(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 type, + u8 *data, u8 data_len) +{ + eir[eir_len++] = sizeof(type) + data_len; + eir[eir_len++] = type; + memcpy(&eir[eir_len], data, data_len); + eir_len += data_len; + + return eir_len; +} + +static inline u16 eir_append_le16(u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 type, u16 data) +{ + eir[eir_len++] = sizeof(type) + sizeof(data); + eir[eir_len++] = type; + put_unaligned_le16(data, &eir[eir_len]); + eir_len += sizeof(data); + + return eir_len; +} + +static inline u16 eir_skb_put_data(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 *data, u8 data_len) +{ + u8 *eir; + u16 eir_len; + + eir_len = eir_precalc_len(data_len); + eir = skb_put(skb, eir_len); + WARN_ON(sizeof(type) + data_len > U8_MAX); + eir[0] = sizeof(type) + data_len; + eir[1] = type; + memcpy(&eir[2], data, data_len); + + return eir_len; +} + +static inline void *eir_get_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u8 type, + size_t *data_len) +{ + size_t parsed = 0; + + if (eir_len < 2) + return NULL; + + while (parsed < eir_len - 1) { + u8 field_len = eir[0]; + + if (field_len == 0) + break; + + parsed += field_len + 1; + + if (parsed > eir_len) + break; + + if (eir[1] != type) { + eir += field_len + 1; + continue; + } + + /* Zero length data */ + if (field_len == 1) + return NULL; + + if (data_len) + *data_len = field_len - 1; + + return &eir[2]; + } + + return NULL; +} + +void *eir_get_service_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u16 uuid, size_t *len); |
