staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/9p/Makefile b/net/9p/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..22794a451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/9p/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P) := 9pnet.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P_FD) += 9pnet_fd.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P_XEN) += 9pnet_xen.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P_VIRTIO) += 9pnet_virtio.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P_RDMA) += 9pnet_rdma.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NET_9P_USBG) += 9pnet_usbg.o
+
+9pnet-objs := \
+	mod.o \
+	client.o \
+	error.o \
+	protocol.o \
+	trans_common.o \
+
+9pnet_fd-objs := \
+	trans_fd.o \
+
+9pnet_virtio-objs := \
+	trans_virtio.o \
+
+9pnet_xen-objs := \
+	trans_xen.o \
+
+9pnet_rdma-objs := \
+	trans_rdma.o \
+
+9pnet_usbg-objs := \
+	trans_usbg.o \