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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/zstd/compress/hist.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/zstd/compress/hist.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/zstd/compress/hist.h | 83 |
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/zstd/compress/hist.h b/lib/zstd/compress/hist.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e5d57d79e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/zstd/compress/hist.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ OR BSD-3-Clause */ +/* ****************************************************************** + * hist : Histogram functions + * part of Finite State Entropy project + * Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. + * + * You can contact the author at : + * - FSE source repository : https://github.com/Cyan4973/FiniteStateEntropy + * - Public forum : https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/lz4c + * + * This source code is licensed under both the BSD-style license (found in the + * LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree) and the GPLv2 (found + * in the COPYING file in the root directory of this source tree). + * You may select, at your option, one of the above-listed licenses. +****************************************************************** */ + +/* --- dependencies --- */ +#include "../common/zstd_deps.h" /* size_t */ + + +/* --- simple histogram functions --- */ + +/*! HIST_count(): + * Provides the precise count of each byte within a table 'count'. + * 'count' is a table of unsigned int, of minimum size (*maxSymbolValuePtr+1). + * Updates *maxSymbolValuePtr with actual largest symbol value detected. + * @return : count of the most frequent symbol (which isn't identified). + * or an error code, which can be tested using HIST_isError(). + * note : if return == srcSize, there is only one symbol. + */ +size_t HIST_count(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr, + const void* src, size_t srcSize); + +unsigned HIST_isError(size_t code); /*< tells if a return value is an error code */ + + +/* --- advanced histogram functions --- */ + +#define HIST_WKSP_SIZE_U32 1024 +#define HIST_WKSP_SIZE (HIST_WKSP_SIZE_U32 * sizeof(unsigned)) +/* HIST_count_wksp() : + * Same as HIST_count(), but using an externally provided scratch buffer. + * Benefit is this function will use very little stack space. + * `workSpace` is a writable buffer which must be 4-bytes aligned, + * `workSpaceSize` must be >= HIST_WKSP_SIZE + */ +size_t HIST_count_wksp(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr, + const void* src, size_t srcSize, + void* workSpace, size_t workSpaceSize); + +/* HIST_countFast() : + * same as HIST_count(), but blindly trusts that all byte values within src are <= *maxSymbolValuePtr. + * This function is unsafe, and will segfault if any value within `src` is `> *maxSymbolValuePtr` + */ +size_t HIST_countFast(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr, + const void* src, size_t srcSize); + +/* HIST_countFast_wksp() : + * Same as HIST_countFast(), but using an externally provided scratch buffer. + * `workSpace` is a writable buffer which must be 4-bytes aligned, + * `workSpaceSize` must be >= HIST_WKSP_SIZE + */ +size_t HIST_countFast_wksp(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr, + const void* src, size_t srcSize, + void* workSpace, size_t workSpaceSize); + +/*! HIST_count_simple() : + * Same as HIST_countFast(), this function is unsafe, + * and will segfault if any value within `src` is `> *maxSymbolValuePtr`. + * It is also a bit slower for large inputs. + * However, it does not need any additional memory (not even on stack). + * @return : count of the most frequent symbol. + * Note this function doesn't produce any error (i.e. it must succeed). + */ +unsigned HIST_count_simple(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr, + const void* src, size_t srcSize); + +/*! HIST_add() : + * Lowest level: just add nb of occurrences of characters from @src into @count. + * @count is not reset. @count array is presumed large enough (i.e. 1 KB). + @ This function does not need any additional stack memory. + */ +void HIST_add(unsigned* count, const void* src, size_t srcSize); |
