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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/zstd/compress/hist.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/zstd/compress/hist.h')
-rw-r--r--lib/zstd/compress/hist.h83
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/zstd/compress/hist.h b/lib/zstd/compress/hist.h
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+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ OR BSD-3-Clause */
+/* ******************************************************************
+ * hist : Histogram functions
+ * part of Finite State Entropy project
+ * Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+ *
+ * You can contact the author at :
+ * - FSE source repository : https://github.com/Cyan4973/FiniteStateEntropy
+ * - Public forum : https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/lz4c
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under both the BSD-style license (found in the
+ * LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree) and the GPLv2 (found
+ * in the COPYING file in the root directory of this source tree).
+ * You may select, at your option, one of the above-listed licenses.
+****************************************************************** */
+
+/* --- dependencies --- */
+#include "../common/zstd_deps.h" /* size_t */
+
+
+/* --- simple histogram functions --- */
+
+/*! HIST_count():
+ * Provides the precise count of each byte within a table 'count'.
+ * 'count' is a table of unsigned int, of minimum size (*maxSymbolValuePtr+1).
+ * Updates *maxSymbolValuePtr with actual largest symbol value detected.
+ * @return : count of the most frequent symbol (which isn't identified).
+ * or an error code, which can be tested using HIST_isError().
+ * note : if return == srcSize, there is only one symbol.
+ */
+size_t HIST_count(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr,
+ const void* src, size_t srcSize);
+
+unsigned HIST_isError(size_t code); /*< tells if a return value is an error code */
+
+
+/* --- advanced histogram functions --- */
+
+#define HIST_WKSP_SIZE_U32 1024
+#define HIST_WKSP_SIZE (HIST_WKSP_SIZE_U32 * sizeof(unsigned))
+/* HIST_count_wksp() :
+ * Same as HIST_count(), but using an externally provided scratch buffer.
+ * Benefit is this function will use very little stack space.
+ * `workSpace` is a writable buffer which must be 4-bytes aligned,
+ * `workSpaceSize` must be >= HIST_WKSP_SIZE
+ */
+size_t HIST_count_wksp(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr,
+ const void* src, size_t srcSize,
+ void* workSpace, size_t workSpaceSize);
+
+/* HIST_countFast() :
+ * same as HIST_count(), but blindly trusts that all byte values within src are <= *maxSymbolValuePtr.
+ * This function is unsafe, and will segfault if any value within `src` is `> *maxSymbolValuePtr`
+ */
+size_t HIST_countFast(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr,
+ const void* src, size_t srcSize);
+
+/* HIST_countFast_wksp() :
+ * Same as HIST_countFast(), but using an externally provided scratch buffer.
+ * `workSpace` is a writable buffer which must be 4-bytes aligned,
+ * `workSpaceSize` must be >= HIST_WKSP_SIZE
+ */
+size_t HIST_countFast_wksp(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr,
+ const void* src, size_t srcSize,
+ void* workSpace, size_t workSpaceSize);
+
+/*! HIST_count_simple() :
+ * Same as HIST_countFast(), this function is unsafe,
+ * and will segfault if any value within `src` is `> *maxSymbolValuePtr`.
+ * It is also a bit slower for large inputs.
+ * However, it does not need any additional memory (not even on stack).
+ * @return : count of the most frequent symbol.
+ * Note this function doesn't produce any error (i.e. it must succeed).
+ */
+unsigned HIST_count_simple(unsigned* count, unsigned* maxSymbolValuePtr,
+ const void* src, size_t srcSize);
+
+/*! HIST_add() :
+ * Lowest level: just add nb of occurrences of characters from @src into @count.
+ * @count is not reset. @count array is presumed large enough (i.e. 1 KB).
+ @ This function does not need any additional stack memory.
+ */
+void HIST_add(unsigned* count, const void* src, size_t srcSize);