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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/zstd/common/allocations.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/zstd/common/allocations.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/zstd/common/allocations.h | 56 |
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/zstd/common/allocations.h b/lib/zstd/common/allocations.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..16c3d08e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/zstd/common/allocations.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ OR BSD-3-Clause */ +/* + * Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This source code is licensed under both the BSD-style license (found in the + * LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree) and the GPLv2 (found + * in the COPYING file in the root directory of this source tree). + * You may select, at your option, one of the above-listed licenses. + */ + +/* This file provides custom allocation primitives + */ + +#define ZSTD_DEPS_NEED_MALLOC +#include "zstd_deps.h" /* ZSTD_malloc, ZSTD_calloc, ZSTD_free, ZSTD_memset */ + +#include "compiler.h" /* MEM_STATIC */ +#define ZSTD_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY +#include <linux/zstd.h> /* ZSTD_customMem */ + +#ifndef ZSTD_ALLOCATIONS_H +#define ZSTD_ALLOCATIONS_H + +/* custom memory allocation functions */ + +MEM_STATIC void* ZSTD_customMalloc(size_t size, ZSTD_customMem customMem) +{ + if (customMem.customAlloc) + return customMem.customAlloc(customMem.opaque, size); + return ZSTD_malloc(size); +} + +MEM_STATIC void* ZSTD_customCalloc(size_t size, ZSTD_customMem customMem) +{ + if (customMem.customAlloc) { + /* calloc implemented as malloc+memset; + * not as efficient as calloc, but next best guess for custom malloc */ + void* const ptr = customMem.customAlloc(customMem.opaque, size); + ZSTD_memset(ptr, 0, size); + return ptr; + } + return ZSTD_calloc(1, size); +} + +MEM_STATIC void ZSTD_customFree(void* ptr, ZSTD_customMem customMem) +{ + if (ptr!=NULL) { + if (customMem.customFree) + customMem.customFree(customMem.opaque, ptr); + else + ZSTD_free(ptr); + } +} + +#endif /* ZSTD_ALLOCATIONS_H */ |
