staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/zlib_inflate/infutil.c b/lib/zlib_inflate/infutil.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12169aacd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/zlib_inflate/infutil.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+#include <linux/zutil.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+/* Utility function: initialize zlib, unpack binary blob, clean up zlib,
+ * return len or negative error code.
+ */
+int zlib_inflate_blob(void *gunzip_buf, unsigned int sz,
+		      const void *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+	const u8 *zbuf = buf;
+	struct z_stream_s *strm;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	strm = kmalloc_obj(*strm);
+	if (strm == NULL)
+		goto gunzip_nomem1;
+	strm->workspace = kmalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (strm->workspace == NULL)
+		goto gunzip_nomem2;
+
+	/* gzip header (1f,8b,08... 10 bytes total + possible asciz filename)
+	 * expected to be stripped from input
+	 */
+	strm->next_in = zbuf;
+	strm->avail_in = len;
+	strm->next_out = gunzip_buf;
+	strm->avail_out = sz;
+
+	rc = zlib_inflateInit2(strm, -MAX_WBITS);
+	if (rc == Z_OK) {
+		rc = zlib_inflate(strm, Z_FINISH);
+		/* after Z_FINISH, only Z_STREAM_END is "we unpacked it all" */
+		if (rc == Z_STREAM_END)
+			rc = sz - strm->avail_out;
+		else
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		zlib_inflateEnd(strm);
+	} else
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	kfree(strm->workspace);
+gunzip_nomem2:
+	kfree(strm);
+gunzip_nomem1:
+	return rc; /* returns Z_OK (0) if successful */
+}