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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-09-25 15:55:03 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-09-25 15:55:03 -0700 |
| commit | 75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23 (patch) | |
| tree | acd8a7d5b5a675042449386efa5b42ec44d8bf81 /lib/usercopy.c | |
| download | linux-stable-75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23.tar.gz linux-stable-75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23.zip | |
Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipegrafted
Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu:
"Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code
analysis.
- move successful policy load auditing under the new policy
directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion
from freeing the policy while it is still being audited
- protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy
evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/usercopy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/usercopy.c | 81 |
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2f0bf104 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/usercopy.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h> +#include <linux/instrumented.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/wordpart.h> + +/* out-of-line parts */ + +#if !defined(INLINE_COPY_USER) +unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + return _inline_copy_from_user(to, from, n); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user); + +unsigned long _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + return _inline_copy_to_user(to, from, n); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_to_user); +#endif + +/** + * check_zeroed_user: check if a userspace buffer only contains zero bytes + * @from: Source address, in userspace. + * @size: Size of buffer. + * + * This is effectively shorthand for "memchr_inv(from, 0, size) == NULL" for + * userspace addresses (and is more efficient because we don't care where the + * first non-zero byte is). + * + * Returns: + * * 0: There were non-zero bytes present in the buffer. + * * 1: The buffer was full of zero bytes. + * * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed. + */ +int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size) +{ + unsigned long val; + uintptr_t align = (uintptr_t) from % sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (unlikely(size == 0)) + return 1; + + from -= align; + size += align; + + if (!user_read_access_begin(from, size)) + return -EFAULT; + + unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault); + if (align) + val &= ~aligned_byte_mask(align); + + while (size > sizeof(unsigned long)) { + if (unlikely(val)) + goto done; + + from += sizeof(unsigned long); + size -= sizeof(unsigned long); + + unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault); + } + + if (size < sizeof(unsigned long)) + val &= aligned_byte_mask(size); + +done: + user_read_access_end(); + return (val == 0); +err_fault: + user_read_access_end(); + return -EFAULT; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_zeroed_user); |
