staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 174 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/test_ubsan.c b/lib/test_ubsan.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a4b6f52b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/test_ubsan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+typedef void(*test_ubsan_fp)(void);
+
+#define UBSAN_TEST(config, ...)	do {					\
+		pr_info("%s " __VA_ARGS__ "%s(%s=%s)\n", __func__,	\
+			sizeof(" " __VA_ARGS__) > 2 ? " " : "",		\
+			#config, IS_ENABLED(config) ? "y" : "n");	\
+	} while (0)
+
+static void test_ubsan_add_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MAX;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
+	val += 2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_sub_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+	volatile int val2 = 2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
+	val -= val2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_mul_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MAX / 2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
+	val *= 3;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_negate_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
+	val = -val;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_divrem_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = 16;
+	volatile int val2 = 0;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO);
+	val /= val2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_truncate_signed(void)
+{
+	volatile long val = LONG_MAX;
+	volatile int val2 = 0;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
+	val2 = val;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds(void)
+{
+	volatile int neg = -1, wrap = 4;
+	volatile int val1 = 10;
+	volatile int val2 = INT_MAX;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT, "negative exponent");
+	val1 <<= neg;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT, "left overflow");
+	val2 <<= wrap;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_out_of_bounds(void)
+{
+	int i = 4, j = 4, k = -1;
+	volatile struct {
+		char above[4]; /* Protect surrounding memory. */
+		int arr[4];
+		char below[4]; /* Protect surrounding memory. */
+	} data;
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(i);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(j);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(k);
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, "above");
+	data.arr[j] = i;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, "below");
+	data.arr[k] = i;
+}
+
+enum ubsan_test_enum {
+	UBSAN_TEST_ZERO = 0,
+	UBSAN_TEST_ONE,
+	UBSAN_TEST_MAX,
+};
+
+static void test_ubsan_load_invalid_value(void)
+{
+	volatile char *dst, *src;
+	bool val, val2, *ptr;
+	enum ubsan_test_enum eval, eval2, *eptr;
+	unsigned char c = 0xff;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL, "bool");
+	dst = (char *)&val;
+	src = &c;
+	*dst = *src;
+
+	ptr = &val2;
+	val2 = val;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM, "enum");
+	dst = (char *)&eval;
+	src = &c;
+	*dst = *src;
+
+	eptr = &eval2;
+	eval2 = eval;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access(void)
+{
+	volatile char arr[5] __aligned(4) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
+	volatile int *ptr, val = 6;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT);
+	ptr = (int *)(arr + 1);
+	*ptr = val;
+}
+
+static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = {
+	test_ubsan_add_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_sub_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_mul_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_negate_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_truncate_signed,
+	test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds,
+	test_ubsan_out_of_bounds,
+	test_ubsan_load_invalid_value,
+	test_ubsan_misaligned_access,
+};
+
+/* Excluded because they Oops the module. */
+static __used const test_ubsan_fp skip_ubsan_array[] = {
+	test_ubsan_divrem_overflow,
+};
+
+static int __init test_ubsan_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test_ubsan_array); i++)
+		test_ubsan_array[i]();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+module_init(test_ubsan_init);
+
+static void __exit test_ubsan_exit(void)
+{
+	/* do nothing */
+}
+module_exit(test_ubsan_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@gmail.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("UBSAN unit test");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");