summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/lib/test_hmm_uapi.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/test_hmm_uapi.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/test_hmm_uapi.h')
-rw-r--r--lib/test_hmm_uapi.h81
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/test_hmm_uapi.h b/lib/test_hmm_uapi.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea9b0ec40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/test_hmm_uapi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+/*
+ * This is a module to test the HMM (Heterogeneous Memory Management) API
+ * of the kernel. It allows a userspace program to expose its entire address
+ * space through the HMM test module device file.
+ */
+#ifndef _LIB_TEST_HMM_UAPI_H
+#define _LIB_TEST_HMM_UAPI_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+
+/*
+ * Structure to pass to the HMM test driver to mimic a device accessing
+ * system memory and ZONE_DEVICE private memory through device page tables.
+ *
+ * @addr: (in) user address the device will read/write
+ * @ptr: (in) user address where device data is copied to/from
+ * @npages: (in) number of pages to read/write
+ * @cpages: (out) number of pages copied
+ * @faults: (out) number of device page faults seen
+ */
+struct hmm_dmirror_cmd {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 ptr;
+ __u64 npages;
+ __u64 cpages;
+ __u64 faults;
+};
+
+/* Expose the address space of the calling process through hmm device file */
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_READ _IOWR('H', 0x00, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_WRITE _IOWR('H', 0x01, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_MIGRATE_TO_DEV _IOWR('H', 0x02, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_MIGRATE_TO_SYS _IOWR('H', 0x03, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_SNAPSHOT _IOWR('H', 0x04, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_CHECK_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x06, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_RELEASE _IOWR('H', 0x07, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_FLAGS _IOWR('H', 0x08, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_READ_UNLOCKED _IOWR('H', 0x09, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
+
+#define HMM_DMIRROR_FLAG_FAIL_ALLOC (1ULL << 0)
+
+/*
+ * Values returned in hmm_dmirror_cmd.ptr for HMM_DMIRROR_SNAPSHOT.
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_ERROR: no valid mirror PTE for this page
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_NONE: unpopulated PTE or PTE with no access
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_READ: read-only PTE
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_WRITE: read/write PTE
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_PMD: PMD sized page is fully mapped by same permissions
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_PUD: PUD sized page is fully mapped by same permissions
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_ZERO: special read-only zero page
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_PRIVATE_LOCAL: Migrated device private page on the
+ * device the ioctl() is made
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_PRIVATE_REMOTE: Migrated device private page on some
+ * other device
+ * HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_COHERENT: Migrate device coherent page on the device
+ * the ioctl() is made
+ */
+enum {
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_ERROR = 0xFF,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_NONE = 0x00,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_READ = 0x01,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_WRITE = 0x02,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_PMD = 0x04,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_PUD = 0x08,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_ZERO = 0x10,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_PRIVATE_LOCAL = 0x20,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_PRIVATE_REMOTE = 0x30,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_COHERENT_LOCAL = 0x40,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_PROT_DEV_COHERENT_REMOTE = 0x50,
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* 0 is reserved to catch uninitialized type fields */
+ HMM_DMIRROR_MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE = 1,
+ HMM_DMIRROR_MEMORY_DEVICE_COHERENT,
+};
+
+#endif /* _LIB_TEST_HMM_UAPI_H */