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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/test_fpu_impl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/test_fpu_impl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/test_fpu_impl.c | 37 |
1 files changed, 37 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/test_fpu_impl.c b/lib/test_fpu_impl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..777894dbb --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/test_fpu_impl.c @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +#include <linux/errno.h> + +#include "test_fpu.h" + +int test_fpu(void) +{ + /* + * This sequence of operations tests that rounding mode is + * to nearest and that denormal numbers are supported. + * Volatile variables are used to avoid compiler optimizing + * the calculations away. + */ + volatile double a, b, c, d, e, f, g; + + a = 4.0; + b = 1e-15; + c = 1e-310; + + /* Sets precision flag */ + d = a + b; + + /* Result depends on rounding mode */ + e = a + b / 2; + + /* Denormal and very large values */ + f = b / c; + + /* Depends on denormal support */ + g = a + c * f; + + if (d > a && e > a && g > a) + return 0; + else + return -EINVAL; +} |
