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| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200 |
| commit | 33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch) | |
| tree | 543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /lib/syscall.c | |
| download | linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip | |
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one
pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant
distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the
base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep
umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56.
These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before
the fix:
- check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused;
- check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by
8: was accepted;
- check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two
bytes past the checked range, was accepted;
- the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data:
was accepted.
These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths:
- subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it
(the range is kept across a new id);
- reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after
the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first;
- spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load
one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy
has the range of the check.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/syscall.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/syscall.c | 88 |
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/syscall.c b/lib/syscall.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..006e256d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/syscall.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <asm/syscall.h> + +static int collect_syscall(struct task_struct *target, struct syscall_info *info) +{ + unsigned long args[6] = { }; + struct pt_regs *regs; + + if (!try_get_task_stack(target)) { + /* Task has no stack, so the task isn't in a syscall. */ + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + info->data.nr = -1; + return 0; + } + + regs = task_pt_regs(target); + if (unlikely(!regs)) { + put_task_stack(target); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + info->sp = user_stack_pointer(regs); + info->data.instruction_pointer = instruction_pointer(regs); + + info->data.nr = syscall_get_nr(target, regs); + if (info->data.nr != -1L) + syscall_get_arguments(target, regs, args); + + info->data.args[0] = args[0]; + info->data.args[1] = args[1]; + info->data.args[2] = args[2]; + info->data.args[3] = args[3]; + info->data.args[4] = args[4]; + info->data.args[5] = args[5]; + + put_task_stack(target); + return 0; +} + +/** + * task_current_syscall - Discover what a blocked task is doing. + * @target: thread to examine + * @info: structure with the following fields: + * .sp - filled with user stack pointer + * .data.nr - filled with system call number or -1 + * .data.args - filled with @maxargs system call arguments + * .data.instruction_pointer - filled with user PC + * + * If @target is blocked in a system call, returns zero with @info.data.nr + * set to the call's number and @info.data.args filled in with its + * arguments. Registers not used for system call arguments may not be available + * and it is not kosher to use &struct user_regset calls while the system + * call is still in progress. Note we may get this result if @target + * has finished its system call but not yet returned to user mode, such + * as when it's stopped for signal handling or syscall exit tracing. + * + * If @target is blocked in the kernel during a fault or exception, + * returns zero with *@info.data.nr set to -1 and does not fill in + * @info.data.args. If so, it's now safe to examine @target using + * &struct user_regset get() calls as long as we're sure @target won't return + * to user mode. + * + * Returns -%EAGAIN if @target does not remain blocked. + */ +int task_current_syscall(struct task_struct *target, struct syscall_info *info) +{ + unsigned long ncsw; + unsigned int state; + + if (target == current) + return collect_syscall(target, info); + + state = READ_ONCE(target->__state); + if (unlikely(!state)) + return -EAGAIN; + + ncsw = wait_task_inactive(target, state); + if (unlikely(!ncsw) || + unlikely(collect_syscall(target, info)) || + unlikely(wait_task_inactive(target, state) != ncsw)) + return -EAGAIN; + + return 0; +} |
