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| author | Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com> | 2026-09-02 00:21:26 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@oss.qualcomm.com> | 2026-09-07 02:24:53 +0100 |
| commit | e24328974a88aa8541e94e8bb8dfa2ade1b3c45d (patch) | |
| tree | 43a2533acc955d11f5cb8be1ecba0ab8ba4cbb1e /lib/strnlen_user.c | |
| download | linux-stable-e24328974a88aa8541e94e8bb8dfa2ade1b3c45d.tar.gz linux-stable-e24328974a88aa8541e94e8bb8dfa2ade1b3c45d.zip | |
iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: claim direct mode for raw readsgrafted
vl53l0x_read_raw() starts a single-shot ranging measurement and reads
back the result. Once the triggered buffer is enabled the sensor runs in
continuous mode and its data-ready interrupt is routed to the trigger,
so a concurrent in_distance_raw read disturbs the streaming setup and
never gets its completion, returning -ETIMEDOUT.
The original submission claimed direct mode here, but it was dropped
during review because the driver had no buffer support at the time [1].
Continuous (buffered) mode was later added without restoring the
claim [2], reintroducing the conflict.
Reject direct reads while buffered capture is active by claiming direct
mode around the measurement, as the vl53l1x sibling already does.
Fixes: 762186c6e7b1 ("iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: Added continuous mode support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20180911160300.GA9212@himanshu-Vostro-3559/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20240909101508.263085-3-abhashkumarjha123@gmail.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@oss.qualcomm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/strnlen_user.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/strnlen_user.c | 129 |
1 files changed, 129 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/strnlen_user.c b/lib/strnlen_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4a6574b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/strnlen_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> + +#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h> + +/* + * Do a strnlen, return length of string *with* final '\0'. + * 'count' is the user-supplied count, while 'max' is the + * address space maximum. + * + * Return 0 for exceptions (which includes hitting the address + * space maximum), or 'count+1' if hitting the user-supplied + * maximum count. + * + * NOTE! We can sometimes overshoot the user-supplied maximum + * if it fits in a aligned 'long'. The caller needs to check + * the return value against "> max". + */ +static __always_inline long do_strnlen_user(const char __user *src, unsigned long count, unsigned long max) +{ + const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS; + unsigned long align, res = 0; + unsigned long c; + + /* + * Do everything aligned. But that means that we + * need to also expand the maximum.. + */ + align = (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1) & (unsigned long)src; + src -= align; + max += align; + + unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)src, efault); + c |= aligned_byte_mask(align); + + for (;;) { + unsigned long data; + if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) { + data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants); + data = create_zero_mask(data); + return res + find_zero(data) + 1 - align; + } + res += sizeof(unsigned long); + /* We already handled 'unsigned long' bytes. Did we do it all ? */ + if (unlikely(max <= sizeof(unsigned long))) + break; + max -= sizeof(unsigned long); + unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), efault); + } + res -= align; + + /* + * Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum + * too? If so, return the marker for "too long". + */ + if (res >= count) + return count+1; + + /* + * Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more + * characters the caller would have wanted. That's 0. + */ +efault: + return 0; +} + +/** + * strnlen_user: - Get the size of a user string INCLUDING final NUL. + * @str: The string to measure. + * @count: Maximum count (including NUL character) + * + * Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are + * enabled. + * + * Get the size of a NUL-terminated string in user space. + * + * Returns the size of the string INCLUDING the terminating NUL. + * If the string is too long, returns a number larger than @count. User + * has to check the return value against "> count". + * On exception (or invalid count), returns 0. + * + * NOTE! You should basically never use this function. There is + * almost never any valid case for using the length of a user space + * string, since the string can be changed at any time by other + * threads. Use "strncpy_from_user()" instead to get a stable copy + * of the string. + */ +long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long count) +{ + unsigned long max_addr, src_addr; + + if (unlikely(count <= 0)) + return 0; + + if (can_do_masked_user_access()) { + long retval; + + str = masked_user_read_access_begin(str); + retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, count); + user_read_access_end(); + return retval; + } + + max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX; + src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(str); + if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) { + unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr; + long retval; + + /* + * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that + * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop + */ + if (max > count) + max = count; + + if (user_read_access_begin(str, max)) { + retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, max); + user_read_access_end(); + return retval; + } + } + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnlen_user); |
