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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/stmp_device.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/stmp_device.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/stmp_device.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/stmp_device.c b/lib/stmp_device.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a4f77b6a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/stmp_device.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Copyright (C) 1999 ARM Limited + * Copyright (C) 2000 Deep Blue Solutions Ltd + * Copyright 2006-2007,2010 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008 Juergen Beisert, kernel@pengutronix.de + * Copyright 2009 Ilya Yanok, Emcraft Systems Ltd, yanok@emcraft.com + * Copyright (C) 2011 Wolfram Sang, Pengutronix e.K. + */ + +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/stmp_device.h> + +#define STMP_MODULE_CLKGATE (1 << 30) +#define STMP_MODULE_SFTRST (1 << 31) + +/* + * Clear the bit and poll it cleared. This is usually called with + * a reset address and mask being either SFTRST(bit 31) or CLKGATE + * (bit 30). + */ +static int stmp_clear_poll_bit(void __iomem *addr, u32 mask) +{ + int timeout = 0x400; + + writel(mask, addr + STMP_OFFSET_REG_CLR); + udelay(1); + while ((readl(addr) & mask) && --timeout) + /* nothing */; + + return !timeout; +} + +int stmp_reset_block(void __iomem *reset_addr) +{ + int ret; + int timeout = 0x400; + + /* clear and poll SFTRST */ + ret = stmp_clear_poll_bit(reset_addr, STMP_MODULE_SFTRST); + if (unlikely(ret)) + goto error; + + /* clear CLKGATE */ + writel(STMP_MODULE_CLKGATE, reset_addr + STMP_OFFSET_REG_CLR); + + /* set SFTRST to reset the block */ + writel(STMP_MODULE_SFTRST, reset_addr + STMP_OFFSET_REG_SET); + udelay(1); + + /* poll CLKGATE becoming set */ + while ((!(readl(reset_addr) & STMP_MODULE_CLKGATE)) && --timeout) + /* nothing */; + if (unlikely(!timeout)) + goto error; + + /* clear and poll SFTRST */ + ret = stmp_clear_poll_bit(reset_addr, STMP_MODULE_SFTRST); + if (unlikely(ret)) + goto error; + + /* clear and poll CLKGATE */ + ret = stmp_clear_poll_bit(reset_addr, STMP_MODULE_CLKGATE); + if (unlikely(ret)) + goto error; + + return 0; + +error: + pr_err("%s(%p): module reset timeout\n", __func__, reset_addr); + return -ETIMEDOUT; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(stmp_reset_block); |
