staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/raid/raid6/unroll.awk b/lib/raid/raid6/unroll.awk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0809805a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/raid/raid6/unroll.awk
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+
+# This filter requires one command line option of form -vN=n
+# where n must be a decimal number.
+#
+# Repeat each input line containing $$ n times, replacing $$ with 0...n-1.
+# Replace each $# with n, and each $* with a single $.
+
+BEGIN {
+	n = N + 0
+}
+{
+	if (/\$\$/) { rep = n } else { rep = 1 }
+	for (i = 0; i < rep; ++i) {
+		tmp = $0
+		gsub(/\$\$/, i, tmp)
+		gsub(/\$#/, n, tmp)
+		gsub(/\$\*/, "$", tmp)
+		print tmp
+	}
+}