staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/net_utils.c b/lib/net_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..215cda672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/net_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/hex.h>
+
+bool mac_pton(const char *s, u8 *mac)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (strnlen(s, MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN) < MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Don't dirty result unless string is valid MAC. */
+	for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++) {
+		if (!isxdigit(s[i * 3]) || !isxdigit(s[i * 3 + 1]))
+			return false;
+		if (i != ETH_ALEN - 1 && s[i * 3 + 2] != ':')
+			return false;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++) {
+		mac[i] = (hex_to_bin(s[i * 3]) << 4) | hex_to_bin(s[i * 3 + 1]);
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(mac_pton);