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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/memweight.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/memweight.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/memweight.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/memweight.c b/lib/memweight.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..94dd72cca --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/memweight.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/bitmap.h> + +/** + * memweight - count the total number of bits set in memory area + * @ptr: pointer to the start of the area + * @bytes: the size of the area + */ +size_t memweight(const void *ptr, size_t bytes) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t longs; + const unsigned char *bitmap = ptr; + + for (; bytes > 0 && ((unsigned long)bitmap) % sizeof(long); + bytes--, bitmap++) + ret += hweight8(*bitmap); + + longs = bytes / sizeof(long); + if (longs) { + BUG_ON(longs >= INT_MAX / BITS_PER_LONG); + ret += bitmap_weight((unsigned long *)bitmap, + longs * BITS_PER_LONG); + bytes -= longs * sizeof(long); + bitmap += longs * sizeof(long); + } + /* + * The reason that this last loop is distinct from the preceding + * bitmap_weight() call is to compute 1-bits in the last region smaller + * than sizeof(long) properly on big-endian systems. + */ + for (; bytes > 0; bytes--, bitmap++) + ret += hweight8(*bitmap); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memweight); |
