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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/kasprintf.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/kasprintf.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/kasprintf.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/kasprintf.c b/lib/kasprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cd2f5974e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/kasprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/lib/kasprintf.c + * + * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds + */ + +#include <linux/stdarg.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +/* Simplified asprintf. */ +char *kvasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + unsigned int first, second; + char *p; + va_list aq; + + va_copy(aq, ap); + first = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, aq); + va_end(aq); + + p = kmalloc_track_caller(first+1, gfp); + if (!p) + return NULL; + + second = vsnprintf(p, first+1, fmt, ap); + WARN(first != second, "different return values (%u and %u) from vsnprintf(\"%s\", ...)", + first, second, fmt); + + return p; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvasprintf); + +/* + * If fmt contains no % (or is exactly %s), use kstrdup_const. If fmt + * (or the sole vararg) points to rodata, we will then save a memory + * allocation and string copy. In any case, the return value should be + * freed using kfree_const(). + */ +const char *kvasprintf_const(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + if (!strchr(fmt, '%')) + return kstrdup_const(fmt, gfp); + if (!strcmp(fmt, "%s")) + return kstrdup_const(va_arg(ap, const char*), gfp); + return kvasprintf(gfp, fmt, ap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvasprintf_const); + +char *kasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *p; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + p = kvasprintf(gfp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return p; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasprintf); |
