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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/kasprintf.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/kasprintf.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/kasprintf.c64
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/kasprintf.c b/lib/kasprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd2f5974e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/kasprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/lib/kasprintf.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+#include <linux/stdarg.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+/* Simplified asprintf. */
+char *kvasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ unsigned int first, second;
+ char *p;
+ va_list aq;
+
+ va_copy(aq, ap);
+ first = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, aq);
+ va_end(aq);
+
+ p = kmalloc_track_caller(first+1, gfp);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ second = vsnprintf(p, first+1, fmt, ap);
+ WARN(first != second, "different return values (%u and %u) from vsnprintf(\"%s\", ...)",
+ first, second, fmt);
+
+ return p;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvasprintf);
+
+/*
+ * If fmt contains no % (or is exactly %s), use kstrdup_const. If fmt
+ * (or the sole vararg) points to rodata, we will then save a memory
+ * allocation and string copy. In any case, the return value should be
+ * freed using kfree_const().
+ */
+const char *kvasprintf_const(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ if (!strchr(fmt, '%'))
+ return kstrdup_const(fmt, gfp);
+ if (!strcmp(fmt, "%s"))
+ return kstrdup_const(va_arg(ap, const char*), gfp);
+ return kvasprintf(gfp, fmt, ap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvasprintf_const);
+
+char *kasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *p;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ p = kvasprintf(gfp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return p;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasprintf);