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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/glob.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/glob.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/glob.c155
1 files changed, 155 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/glob.c b/lib/glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c80d9dd73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/glob.c
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+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR MIT)
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/glob.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+
+/*
+ * The only reason this code can be compiled as a module is because the
+ * ATA code that depends on it can be as well. In practice, they're
+ * both usually compiled in and the module overhead goes away.
+ */
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("glob(7) matching");
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL");
+
+static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
+ char const *str_end);
+
+/**
+ * glob_match - Shell-style pattern matching, like !fnmatch(pat, str, 0)
+ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match, e.g. "*.[ch]".
+ * @str: String to match. The pattern must match the entire string.
+ *
+ * Perform shell-style glob matching, returning true (1) if the match
+ * succeeds, or false (0) if it fails. Equivalent to !fnmatch(@pat, @str, 0).
+ *
+ * Pattern metacharacters are ?, *, [ and \.
+ * (And, inside character classes, !, - and ].)
+ *
+ * This is a small and simple implementation intended for device denylists
+ * where a string is matched against a number of patterns. Thus, it
+ * does not preprocess the patterns. It is non-recursive, and run-time
+ * is at most quadratic: strlen(@str)*strlen(@pat).
+ *
+ * An example of the worst case is glob_match("*aaaaa", "aaaaaaaaaa");
+ * it takes 6 passes over the pattern before matching the string.
+ *
+ * Like !fnmatch(@pat, @str, 0) and unlike the shell, this does NOT
+ * treat / or leading . specially; it isn't actually used for pathnames.
+ *
+ * Note that according to glob(7) (and unlike bash), character classes
+ * are complemented by a leading !; this does not support the regex-style
+ * [^a-z] syntax.
+ *
+ * An opening bracket without a matching close is matched literally.
+ */
+bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str)
+{
+ return glob_match_str(pat, str, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match);
+
+/**
+ * glob_match_len - glob match against a length-bounded string
+ * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match.
+ * @str: String to match. Need not be NUL-terminated.
+ * @len: Number of bytes of @str that may be read.
+ *
+ * Like glob_match(), but @str is only read up to @len bytes, so it can be
+ * used on buffers that are not NUL-terminated (e.g. trace event fields).
+ * A NUL byte within @len still terminates the string.
+ */
+bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len)
+{
+ return glob_match_str(pat, str, str + len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match_len);
+
+static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str,
+ char const *str_end)
+{
+ /*
+ * Backtrack to previous * on mismatch and retry starting one
+ * character later in the string. Because * matches all characters
+ * (no exception for /), it can be easily proved that there's
+ * never a need to backtrack multiple levels.
+ */
+ char const *back_pat = NULL, *back_str = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Loop over each token (character or class) in pat, matching
+ * it against the remaining unmatched tail of str. Return false
+ * on mismatch, or true after matching the trailing nul bytes.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned char c = (str_end && str >= str_end) ? '\0' : *str;
+ unsigned char d = *pat++;
+
+ str++;
+
+ switch (d) {
+ case '?': /* Wildcard: anything but nul */
+ if (c == '\0')
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '*': /* Any-length wildcard */
+ if (*pat == '\0') /* Optimize trailing * case */
+ return true;
+ back_pat = pat;
+ back_str = --str; /* Allow zero-length match */
+ break;
+ case '[': { /* Character class */
+ if (c == '\0') /* No possible match */
+ return false;
+ bool match = false, inverted = (*pat == '!');
+ char const *class = inverted ? pat + 1 : pat;
+ unsigned char a = *class++;
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate over each span in the character class.
+ * A span is either a single character a, or a
+ * range a-b. The first span may begin with ']'.
+ */
+ do {
+ unsigned char b = a;
+
+ if (a == '\0') /* Malformed */
+ goto literal;
+
+ if (class[0] == '-' && class[1] != ']') {
+ b = class[1];
+
+ if (b == '\0')
+ goto literal;
+
+ class += 2;
+ /* Any special action if a > b? */
+ }
+ if (a <= c && c <= b)
+ match = true;
+ } while ((a = *class++) != ']');
+
+ if (match == inverted)
+ goto backtrack;
+ pat = class;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '\\':
+ d = *pat++;
+ fallthrough;
+ default: /* Literal character */
+literal:
+ if (c == d) {
+ if (d == '\0')
+ return true;
+ break;
+ }
+backtrack:
+ if (c == '\0' || !back_pat)
+ return false; /* No point continuing */
+ /* Try again from last *, one character later in str. */
+ pat = back_pat;
+ str = ++back_str;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}