diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/extable.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/extable.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/extable.c | 118 |
1 files changed, 118 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/extable.c b/lib/extable.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9c9f40bd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/extable.c @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Derived from arch/ppc/mm/extable.c and arch/i386/mm/extable.c. + * + * Copyright (C) 2004 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corp. + */ + +#include <linux/bsearch.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/sort.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/extable.h> + +#ifndef ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE +#define ex_to_insn(x) ((x)->insn) +#else +static inline unsigned long ex_to_insn(const struct exception_table_entry *x) +{ + return (unsigned long)&x->insn + x->insn; +} +#endif + +#ifndef ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE +#define swap_ex NULL +#else +static void swap_ex(void *a, void *b, int size) +{ + struct exception_table_entry *x = a, *y = b, tmp; + int delta = b - a; + + tmp = *x; + x->insn = y->insn + delta; + y->insn = tmp.insn - delta; + +#ifdef swap_ex_entry_fixup + swap_ex_entry_fixup(x, y, tmp, delta); +#else + x->fixup = y->fixup + delta; + y->fixup = tmp.fixup - delta; +#endif +} +#endif /* ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE */ + +/* + * The exception table needs to be sorted so that the binary + * search that we use to find entries in it works properly. + * This is used both for the kernel exception table and for + * the exception tables of modules that get loaded. + */ +static int cmp_ex_sort(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const struct exception_table_entry *x = a, *y = b; + + /* avoid overflow */ + if (ex_to_insn(x) > ex_to_insn(y)) + return 1; + if (ex_to_insn(x) < ex_to_insn(y)) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +void sort_extable(struct exception_table_entry *start, + struct exception_table_entry *finish) +{ + sort(start, finish - start, sizeof(struct exception_table_entry), + cmp_ex_sort, swap_ex); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +/* + * If the exception table is sorted, any referring to the module init + * will be at the beginning or the end. + */ +void trim_init_extable(struct module *m) +{ + /*trim the beginning*/ + while (m->num_exentries && + within_module_init(ex_to_insn(&m->extable[0]), m)) { + m->extable++; + m->num_exentries--; + } + /*trim the end*/ + while (m->num_exentries && + within_module_init(ex_to_insn(&m->extable[m->num_exentries - 1]), + m)) + m->num_exentries--; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */ + +static int cmp_ex_search(const void *key, const void *elt) +{ + const struct exception_table_entry *_elt = elt; + unsigned long _key = *(unsigned long *)key; + + /* avoid overflow */ + if (_key > ex_to_insn(_elt)) + return 1; + if (_key < ex_to_insn(_elt)) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Search one exception table for an entry corresponding to the + * given instruction address, and return the address of the entry, + * or NULL if none is found. + * We use a binary search, and thus we assume that the table is + * already sorted. + */ +const struct exception_table_entry * +search_extable(const struct exception_table_entry *base, + const size_t num, + unsigned long value) +{ + return bsearch(&value, base, num, + sizeof(struct exception_table_entry), cmp_ex_search); +} |
