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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/extable.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/extable.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/extable.c118
1 files changed, 118 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/extable.c b/lib/extable.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9c9f40bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/extable.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Derived from arch/ppc/mm/extable.c and arch/i386/mm/extable.c.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corp.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/extable.h>
+
+#ifndef ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE
+#define ex_to_insn(x) ((x)->insn)
+#else
+static inline unsigned long ex_to_insn(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
+{
+ return (unsigned long)&x->insn + x->insn;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE
+#define swap_ex NULL
+#else
+static void swap_ex(void *a, void *b, int size)
+{
+ struct exception_table_entry *x = a, *y = b, tmp;
+ int delta = b - a;
+
+ tmp = *x;
+ x->insn = y->insn + delta;
+ y->insn = tmp.insn - delta;
+
+#ifdef swap_ex_entry_fixup
+ swap_ex_entry_fixup(x, y, tmp, delta);
+#else
+ x->fixup = y->fixup + delta;
+ y->fixup = tmp.fixup - delta;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE */
+
+/*
+ * The exception table needs to be sorted so that the binary
+ * search that we use to find entries in it works properly.
+ * This is used both for the kernel exception table and for
+ * the exception tables of modules that get loaded.
+ */
+static int cmp_ex_sort(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const struct exception_table_entry *x = a, *y = b;
+
+ /* avoid overflow */
+ if (ex_to_insn(x) > ex_to_insn(y))
+ return 1;
+ if (ex_to_insn(x) < ex_to_insn(y))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void sort_extable(struct exception_table_entry *start,
+ struct exception_table_entry *finish)
+{
+ sort(start, finish - start, sizeof(struct exception_table_entry),
+ cmp_ex_sort, swap_ex);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+/*
+ * If the exception table is sorted, any referring to the module init
+ * will be at the beginning or the end.
+ */
+void trim_init_extable(struct module *m)
+{
+ /*trim the beginning*/
+ while (m->num_exentries &&
+ within_module_init(ex_to_insn(&m->extable[0]), m)) {
+ m->extable++;
+ m->num_exentries--;
+ }
+ /*trim the end*/
+ while (m->num_exentries &&
+ within_module_init(ex_to_insn(&m->extable[m->num_exentries - 1]),
+ m))
+ m->num_exentries--;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
+
+static int cmp_ex_search(const void *key, const void *elt)
+{
+ const struct exception_table_entry *_elt = elt;
+ unsigned long _key = *(unsigned long *)key;
+
+ /* avoid overflow */
+ if (_key > ex_to_insn(_elt))
+ return 1;
+ if (_key < ex_to_insn(_elt))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search one exception table for an entry corresponding to the
+ * given instruction address, and return the address of the entry,
+ * or NULL if none is found.
+ * We use a binary search, and thus we assume that the table is
+ * already sorted.
+ */
+const struct exception_table_entry *
+search_extable(const struct exception_table_entry *base,
+ const size_t num,
+ unsigned long value)
+{
+ return bsearch(&value, base, num,
+ sizeof(struct exception_table_entry), cmp_ex_search);
+}