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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/earlycpio.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/earlycpio.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/earlycpio.c | 141 |
1 files changed, 141 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/earlycpio.c b/lib/earlycpio.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d2c37d64f --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/earlycpio.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * + * + * Copyright 2012 Intel Corporation; author H. Peter Anvin + * + * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* + * earlycpio.c + * + * Find a specific cpio member; must precede any compressed content. + * This is used to locate data items in the initramfs used by the + * kernel itself during early boot (before the main initramfs is + * decompressed.) It is the responsibility of the initramfs creator + * to ensure that these items are uncompressed at the head of the + * blob. Depending on the boot loader or package tool that may be a + * separate file or part of the same file. + */ + +#include <linux/earlycpio.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +enum cpio_fields { + C_MAGIC, + C_INO, + C_MODE, + C_UID, + C_GID, + C_NLINK, + C_MTIME, + C_FILESIZE, + C_MAJ, + C_MIN, + C_RMAJ, + C_RMIN, + C_NAMESIZE, + C_CHKSUM, + C_NFIELDS +}; + +/** + * find_cpio_data - Search for files in an uncompressed cpio + * @path: The directory to search for, including a slash at the end + * @data: Pointer to the cpio archive or a header inside + * @len: Remaining length of the cpio based on data pointer + * @nextoff: When a matching file is found, this is the offset from the + * beginning of the cpio to the beginning of the next file, not the + * matching file itself. It can be used to iterate through the cpio + * to find all files inside of a directory path. + * + * Return: &struct cpio_data containing the address, length and + * filename (with the directory path cut off) of the found file. + * If you search for a filename and not for files in a directory, + * pass the absolute path of the filename in the cpio and make sure + * the match returned an empty filename string. + */ + +struct cpio_data find_cpio_data(const char *path, void *data, + size_t len, long *nextoff) +{ + const size_t cpio_header_len = 8*C_NFIELDS - 2; + struct cpio_data cd = { NULL, 0, "" }; + const char *p, *dptr, *nptr; + unsigned int ch[C_NFIELDS], *chp, v; + unsigned char c, x; + size_t mypathsize = strlen(path); + int i, j; + + p = data; + + while (len > cpio_header_len) { + if (!*p) { + /* All cpio headers need to be 4-byte aligned */ + p += 4; + len -= 4; + continue; + } + + j = 6; /* The magic field is only 6 characters */ + chp = ch; + for (i = C_NFIELDS; i; i--) { + v = 0; + while (j--) { + v <<= 4; + c = *p++; + + x = c - '0'; + if (x < 10) { + v += x; + continue; + } + + x = (c | 0x20) - 'a'; + if (x < 6) { + v += x + 10; + continue; + } + + goto quit; /* Invalid hexadecimal */ + } + *chp++ = v; + j = 8; /* All other fields are 8 characters */ + } + + if ((ch[C_MAGIC] - 0x070701) > 1) + goto quit; /* Invalid magic */ + + len -= cpio_header_len; + + dptr = PTR_ALIGN(p + ch[C_NAMESIZE], 4); + nptr = PTR_ALIGN(dptr + ch[C_FILESIZE], 4); + + if (nptr > p + len || dptr < p || nptr < dptr) + goto quit; /* Buffer overrun */ + + if ((ch[C_MODE] & 0170000) == 0100000 && + ch[C_NAMESIZE] >= mypathsize && + !memcmp(p, path, mypathsize)) { + + if (nextoff) + *nextoff = (long)nptr - (long)data; + + if (ch[C_NAMESIZE] - mypathsize >= MAX_CPIO_FILE_NAME) { + pr_warn( + "File %s exceeding MAX_CPIO_FILE_NAME [%d]\n", + p, MAX_CPIO_FILE_NAME); + } + strscpy(cd.name, p + mypathsize, MAX_CPIO_FILE_NAME); + + cd.data = (void *)dptr; + cd.size = ch[C_FILESIZE]; + return cd; /* Found it! */ + } + len -= (nptr - p); + p = nptr; + } + +quit: + return cd; +} |
