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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/decompress.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/decompress.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/decompress.c | 83 |
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/decompress.c b/lib/decompress.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..778547158 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/decompress.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * decompress.c + * + * Detect the decompression method based on magic number + */ + +#include <linux/decompress/generic.h> + +#include <linux/decompress/bunzip2.h> +#include <linux/decompress/unlzma.h> +#include <linux/decompress/unxz.h> +#include <linux/decompress/inflate.h> +#include <linux/decompress/unlzo.h> +#include <linux/decompress/unlz4.h> +#include <linux/decompress/unzstd.h> + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> + +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_GZIP +# define gunzip NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_BZIP2 +# define bunzip2 NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZMA +# define unlzma NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_XZ +# define unxz NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZO +# define unlzo NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZ4 +# define unlz4 NULL +#endif +#ifndef CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_ZSTD +# define unzstd NULL +#endif + +struct compress_format { + unsigned char magic[2]; + const char *name; + decompress_fn decompressor; +}; + +static const struct compress_format compressed_formats[] __initconst = { + { .magic = {0x1f, 0x8b}, .name = "gzip", .decompressor = gunzip }, + { .magic = {0x1f, 0x9e}, .name = "gzip", .decompressor = gunzip }, + { .magic = {0x42, 0x5a}, .name = "bzip2", .decompressor = bunzip2 }, + { .magic = {0x5d, 0x00}, .name = "lzma", .decompressor = unlzma }, + { .magic = {0xfd, 0x37}, .name = "xz", .decompressor = unxz }, + { .magic = {0x89, 0x4c}, .name = "lzo", .decompressor = unlzo }, + { .magic = {0x02, 0x21}, .name = "lz4", .decompressor = unlz4 }, + { .magic = {0x28, 0xb5}, .name = "zstd", .decompressor = unzstd }, + { /* sentinel */ } +}; + +decompress_fn __init decompress_method(const unsigned char *inbuf, long len, + const char **name) +{ + const struct compress_format *cf; + + if (len < 2) { + if (name) + *name = NULL; + return NULL; /* Need at least this much... */ + } + + pr_debug("Compressed data magic: %#.2x %#.2x\n", inbuf[0], inbuf[1]); + + for (cf = compressed_formats; cf->name; cf++) + if (!memcmp(inbuf, cf->magic, 2)) + break; + + if (name) + *name = cf->name; + return cf->decompressor; +} |
