drm/mediatek: Add missing IS_ERR check for ovl_adaptor platform devicegrafted

platform_device_register_data() can fail and return an ERR_PTR, but the
return value is used without checking, leading to an invalid pointer
being stored in ddp_comp[].dev and passed to component_match_add() and
mtk_ddp_comp_init(), which could result in a kernel crash.

Add an IS_ERR() check to jump to the error handling path on failure.

Fixes: 0d9eee9118b7 ("drm/mediatek: Add drm ovl_adaptor sub driver for MT8195")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haojie Li <lihaojie@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: CK Hu <ck.hu@mediatek.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mediatek/patch/20260825100845.438893-1-lihaojie@kylinos.cn/
Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <chunkuang.hu@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/riscv/aes.h b/lib/crypto/riscv/aes.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b26f58fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/riscv/aes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 VRULL GmbH
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 SiFive, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2024 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <asm/simd.h>
+#include <asm/vector.h>
+
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_zvkned);
+
+void aes_encrypt_zvkned(const u32 rndkeys[], int key_len,
+			u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+void aes_decrypt_zvkned(const u32 rndkeys[], int key_len,
+			u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+
+static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k,
+				union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k,
+				const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds)
+{
+	aes_expandkey_generic(k->rndkeys, inv_k ? inv_k->inv_rndkeys : NULL,
+			      in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key,
+			     u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+			     const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&have_zvkned) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
+		kernel_vector_begin();
+		aes_encrypt_zvkned(key->k.rndkeys, key->len, out, in);
+		kernel_vector_end();
+	} else {
+		aes_encrypt_generic(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in);
+	}
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key,
+			     u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+			     const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that the Zvkned code uses the standard round keys, while the
+	 * fallback uses the inverse round keys.  Thus both must be present.
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_likely(&have_zvkned) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
+		kernel_vector_begin();
+		aes_decrypt_zvkned(key->k.rndkeys, key->len, out, in);
+		kernel_vector_end();
+	} else {
+		aes_decrypt_generic(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds,
+				    out, in);
+	}
+}
+
+#define aes_mod_init_arch aes_mod_init_arch
+static void aes_mod_init_arch(void)
+{
+	if (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKNED) &&
+	    riscv_vector_vlen() >= 128)
+		static_branch_enable(&have_zvkned);
+}