x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 109 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/powerpc/gf128hash.h b/lib/crypto/powerpc/gf128hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..629cd325d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/powerpc/gf128hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * GHASH routines supporting VMX instructions on the Power 8
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, 2019 International Business Machines Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 - 2018 Linaro Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <asm/simd.h>
+#include <asm/switch_to.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(have_vec_crypto);
+
+void gcm_init_p8(u64 htable[4][2], const u8 h[16]);
+void gcm_gmult_p8(u8 Xi[16], const u64 htable[4][2]);
+void gcm_ghash_p8(u8 Xi[16], const u64 htable[4][2], const u8 *in, size_t len);
+
+#define ghash_preparekey_arch ghash_preparekey_arch
+static void ghash_preparekey_arch(struct ghash_key *key,
+				  const u8 raw_key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+	ghash_key_to_polyval(raw_key, &key->h);
+
+	if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
+		preempt_disable();
+		pagefault_disable();
+		enable_kernel_vsx();
+		gcm_init_p8(key->htable, raw_key);
+		disable_kernel_vsx();
+		pagefault_enable();
+		preempt_enable();
+	} else {
+		/* This reproduces gcm_init_p8() on both LE and BE systems. */
+		key->htable[0][0] = 0;
+		key->htable[0][1] = 0xc200000000000000;
+
+		key->htable[1][0] = 0;
+		key->htable[1][1] = le64_to_cpu(key->h.lo);
+
+		key->htable[2][0] = le64_to_cpu(key->h.lo);
+		key->htable[2][1] = le64_to_cpu(key->h.hi);
+
+		key->htable[3][0] = le64_to_cpu(key->h.hi);
+		key->htable[3][1] = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+#define ghash_mul_arch ghash_mul_arch
+static void ghash_mul_arch(struct polyval_elem *acc,
+			   const struct ghash_key *key)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
+		u8 ghash_acc[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+		polyval_acc_to_ghash(acc, ghash_acc);
+
+		preempt_disable();
+		pagefault_disable();
+		enable_kernel_vsx();
+		gcm_gmult_p8(ghash_acc, key->htable);
+		disable_kernel_vsx();
+		pagefault_enable();
+		preempt_enable();
+
+		ghash_acc_to_polyval(ghash_acc, acc);
+		memzero_explicit(ghash_acc, sizeof(ghash_acc));
+	} else {
+		polyval_mul_generic(acc, &key->h);
+	}
+}
+
+#define ghash_blocks_arch ghash_blocks_arch
+static void ghash_blocks_arch(struct polyval_elem *acc,
+			      const struct ghash_key *key,
+			      const u8 *data, size_t nblocks)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&have_vec_crypto) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
+		u8 ghash_acc[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+		polyval_acc_to_ghash(acc, ghash_acc);
+
+		preempt_disable();
+		pagefault_disable();
+		enable_kernel_vsx();
+		gcm_ghash_p8(ghash_acc, key->htable, data,
+			     nblocks * GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		disable_kernel_vsx();
+		pagefault_enable();
+		preempt_enable();
+
+		ghash_acc_to_polyval(ghash_acc, acc);
+		memzero_explicit(ghash_acc, sizeof(ghash_acc));
+	} else {
+		ghash_blocks_generic(acc, &key->h, data, nblocks);
+	}
+}
+
+#define gf128hash_mod_init_arch gf128hash_mod_init_arch
+static void gf128hash_mod_init_arch(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) &&
+	    (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 & PPC_FEATURE2_VEC_CRYPTO))
+		static_branch_enable(&have_vec_crypto);
+}