staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f313ccc4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
+ *
+ * Based on public domain code by Andrew Moon and Daniel J. Bernstein.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/poly1305.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_ARCH
+#include "poly1305.h" /* $(SRCARCH)/poly1305.h */
+#else
+#define poly1305_block_init	poly1305_block_init_generic
+#define poly1305_blocks		poly1305_blocks_generic
+#define poly1305_emit		poly1305_emit_generic
+#endif
+
+void poly1305_init(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
+		   const u8 key[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+	desc->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 16);
+	desc->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 20);
+	desc->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 24);
+	desc->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 28);
+	desc->buflen = 0;
+	poly1305_block_init(&desc->state, key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_init);
+
+void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
+		     const u8 *src, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	if (desc->buflen + nbytes >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		unsigned int bulk_len;
+
+		if (desc->buflen) {
+			unsigned int l = POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen;
+
+			memcpy(&desc->buf[desc->buflen], src, l);
+			src += l;
+			nbytes -= l;
+
+			poly1305_blocks(&desc->state, desc->buf,
+					POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
+			desc->buflen = 0;
+		}
+
+		bulk_len = round_down(nbytes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		nbytes %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		if (bulk_len) {
+			poly1305_blocks(&desc->state, src, bulk_len, 1);
+			src += bulk_len;
+		}
+	}
+	if (nbytes) {
+		memcpy(&desc->buf[desc->buflen], src, nbytes);
+		desc->buflen += nbytes;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_update);
+
+void poly1305_final(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+	if (unlikely(desc->buflen)) {
+		desc->buf[desc->buflen++] = 1;
+		memset(desc->buf + desc->buflen, 0,
+		       POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen);
+		poly1305_blocks(&desc->state, desc->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				0);
+	}
+
+	poly1305_emit(&desc->state.h, dst, desc->s);
+	*desc = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){};
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final);
+
+#ifdef poly1305_mod_init_arch
+static int __init poly1305_mod_init(void)
+{
+	poly1305_mod_init_arch();
+	return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(poly1305_mod_init);
+
+static void __exit poly1305_mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+module_exit(poly1305_mod_exit);
+#endif
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539");