staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/nh.c b/lib/crypto/nh.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1d0095b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/nh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the NH almost-universal hash function, specifically the
+ * variant of NH used in Adiantum.  This is *not* a cryptographic hash function.
+ *
+ * Reference: section 6.3 of "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for
+ * entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf).
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/nh.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_NH_ARCH
+#include "nh.h" /* $(SRCARCH)/nh.h */
+#else
+static bool nh_arch(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len,
+		    __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES])
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+void nh(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len,
+	__le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES])
+{
+	u64 sums[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+	if (nh_arch(key, message, message_len, hash))
+		return;
+
+	static_assert(NH_PAIR_STRIDE == 2);
+	static_assert(NH_NUM_PASSES == 4);
+
+	while (message_len) {
+		u32 m0 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 0);
+		u32 m1 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 4);
+		u32 m2 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 8);
+		u32 m3 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 12);
+
+		sums[0] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[0]) * (u32)(m2 + key[2]);
+		sums[1] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[4]) * (u32)(m2 + key[6]);
+		sums[2] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[8]) * (u32)(m2 + key[10]);
+		sums[3] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[12]) * (u32)(m2 + key[14]);
+		sums[0] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[1]) * (u32)(m3 + key[3]);
+		sums[1] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[5]) * (u32)(m3 + key[7]);
+		sums[2] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[9]) * (u32)(m3 + key[11]);
+		sums[3] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[13]) * (u32)(m3 + key[15]);
+		key += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT / sizeof(key[0]);
+		message += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT;
+		message_len -= NH_MESSAGE_UNIT;
+	}
+
+	hash[0] = cpu_to_le64(sums[0]);
+	hash[1] = cpu_to_le64(sums[1]);
+	hash[2] = cpu_to_le64(sums[2]);
+	hash[3] = cpu_to_le64(sums[3]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nh);
+
+#ifdef nh_mod_init_arch
+static int __init nh_mod_init(void)
+{
+	nh_mod_init_arch();
+	return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(nh_mod_init);
+
+static void __exit nh_mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+module_exit(nh_mod_exit);
+#endif
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NH almost-universal hash function");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");