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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c | 120 |
1 files changed, 120 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c0375c167 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/mpi/mpi-add.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* mpi-add.c - MPI functions + * Copyright (C) 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, + * 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of Libgcrypt. + * + * Note: This code is heavily based on the GNU MP Library. + * Actually it's the same code with only minor changes in the + * way the data is stored; this is to support the abstraction + * of an optional secure memory allocation which may be used + * to avoid revealing of sensitive data due to paging etc. + */ + +#include <linux/export.h> + +#include "mpi-internal.h" + +int mpi_add(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v) +{ + mpi_ptr_t wp, up, vp; + mpi_size_t usize, vsize, wsize; + int usign, vsign, wsign; + int err; + + if (u->nlimbs < v->nlimbs) { /* Swap U and V. */ + usize = v->nlimbs; + usign = v->sign; + vsize = u->nlimbs; + vsign = u->sign; + wsize = usize + 1; + err = RESIZE_IF_NEEDED(w, wsize); + if (err) + return err; + /* These must be after realloc (u or v may be the same as w). */ + up = v->d; + vp = u->d; + } else { + usize = u->nlimbs; + usign = u->sign; + vsize = v->nlimbs; + vsign = v->sign; + wsize = usize + 1; + err = RESIZE_IF_NEEDED(w, wsize); + if (err) + return err; + /* These must be after realloc (u or v may be the same as w). */ + up = u->d; + vp = v->d; + } + wp = w->d; + wsign = 0; + + if (!vsize) { /* simple */ + MPN_COPY(wp, up, usize); + wsize = usize; + wsign = usign; + } else if (usign != vsign) { /* different sign */ + /* This test is right since USIZE >= VSIZE */ + if (usize != vsize) { + mpihelp_sub(wp, up, usize, vp, vsize); + wsize = usize; + MPN_NORMALIZE(wp, wsize); + wsign = usign; + } else if (mpihelp_cmp(up, vp, usize) < 0) { + mpihelp_sub_n(wp, vp, up, usize); + wsize = usize; + MPN_NORMALIZE(wp, wsize); + if (!usign) + wsign = 1; + } else { + mpihelp_sub_n(wp, up, vp, usize); + wsize = usize; + MPN_NORMALIZE(wp, wsize); + if (usign) + wsign = 1; + } + } else { /* U and V have same sign. Add them. */ + mpi_limb_t cy = mpihelp_add(wp, up, usize, vp, vsize); + wp[usize] = cy; + wsize = usize + cy; + if (usign) + wsign = 1; + } + + w->nlimbs = wsize; + w->sign = wsign; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_add); + +int mpi_sub(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v) +{ + int err; + MPI vv; + + vv = mpi_copy(v); + if (!vv) + return -ENOMEM; + + vv->sign = !vv->sign; + err = mpi_add(w, u, vv); + mpi_free(vv); + + return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_sub); + +int mpi_addm(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v, MPI m) +{ + return mpi_add(w, u, v) ?: + mpi_mod(w, w, m); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_addm); + +int mpi_subm(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v, MPI m) +{ + return mpi_sub(w, u, v) ?: + mpi_mod(w, w, m); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_subm); |
