x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 159 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71578a084
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/unroll.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = {
+	{ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 },
+	{ 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 },
+	{ 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 },
+	{ 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 },
+	{ 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 },
+	{ 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 },
+	{ 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 },
+	{ 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 },
+	{ 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 },
+	{ 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 },
+};
+
+static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, u32 inc)
+{
+	ctx->t[0] += inc;
+	ctx->t[1] += (ctx->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+static void __maybe_unused
+blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx,
+			 const u8 *data, size_t nblocks, u32 inc)
+{
+	u32 m[16];
+	u32 v[16];
+	int i;
+
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
+		(nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE));
+
+	while (nblocks > 0) {
+		blake2s_increment_counter(ctx, inc);
+		memcpy(m, data, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m));
+		memcpy(v, ctx->h, 32);
+		v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0;
+		v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
+		v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
+		v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
+		v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ ctx->t[0];
+		v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ ctx->t[1];
+		v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ ctx->f[0];
+		v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ ctx->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \
+	a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \
+	d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \
+	c += d; \
+	b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \
+	a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \
+	d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \
+	c += d; \
+	b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \
+} while (0)
+
+		/*
+		 * Unroll the rounds loop to enable constant-folding of the
+		 * blake2s_sigma values.
+		 */
+		unrolled_full
+		for (int r = 0; r < 10; r++) {
+			G(r, 0, v[0], v[4], v[8], v[12]);
+			G(r, 1, v[1], v[5], v[9], v[13]);
+			G(r, 2, v[2], v[6], v[10], v[14]);
+			G(r, 3, v[3], v[7], v[11], v[15]);
+			G(r, 4, v[0], v[5], v[10], v[15]);
+			G(r, 5, v[1], v[6], v[11], v[12]);
+			G(r, 6, v[2], v[7], v[8], v[13]);
+			G(r, 7, v[3], v[4], v[9], v[14]);
+		}
+#undef G
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+			ctx->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+
+		data += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		--nblocks;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_ARCH
+#include "blake2s.h" /* $(SRCARCH)/blake2s.h */
+#else
+#define blake2s_compress blake2s_compress_generic
+#endif
+
+static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->buflen;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inlen))
+		return;
+	if (inlen > fill) {
+		memcpy(ctx->buf + ctx->buflen, in, fill);
+		blake2s_compress(ctx, ctx->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctx->buflen = 0;
+		in += fill;
+		inlen -= fill;
+	}
+	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+		blake2s_compress(ctx, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+	}
+	memcpy(ctx->buf + ctx->buflen, in, inlen);
+	ctx->buflen += inlen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
+
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, u8 *out)
+{
+	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
+	blake2s_set_lastblock(ctx);
+	memset(ctx->buf + ctx->buflen, 0,
+	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->buflen); /* Padding */
+	blake2s_compress(ctx, ctx->buf, 1, ctx->buflen);
+	cpu_to_le32_array(ctx->h, ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->h));
+	memcpy(out, ctx->h, ctx->outlen);
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
+
+#ifdef blake2s_mod_init_arch
+static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+{
+	blake2s_mod_init_arch();
+	return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(blake2s_mod_init);
+#endif
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");