drm/mediatek: Add missing IS_ERR check for ovl_adaptor platform devicegrafted

platform_device_register_data() can fail and return an ERR_PTR, but the
return value is used without checking, leading to an invalid pointer
being stored in ddp_comp[].dev and passed to component_match_add() and
mtk_ddp_comp_init(), which could result in a kernel crash.

Add an IS_ERR() check to jump to the error handling path on failure.

Fixes: 0d9eee9118b7 ("drm/mediatek: Add drm ovl_adaptor sub driver for MT8195")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haojie Li <lihaojie@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: CK Hu <ck.hu@mediatek.com>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mediatek/patch/20260825100845.438893-1-lihaojie@kylinos.cn/
Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <chunkuang.hu@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/crypto/arm/aes.h b/lib/crypto/arm/aes.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1dd7dfa65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/arm/aes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AES block cipher, optimized for ARM
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Linaro Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+ */
+
+asmlinkage void __aes_arm_encrypt(const u32 rk[], int rounds,
+				  const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+				  u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+asmlinkage void __aes_arm_decrypt(const u32 inv_rk[], int rounds,
+				  const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+				  u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+
+static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k,
+				union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k,
+				const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds)
+{
+	aes_expandkey_generic(k->rndkeys, inv_k ? inv_k->inv_rndkeys : NULL,
+			      in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key,
+			     u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+			     const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+	    !IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)out | (uintptr_t)in, 4)) {
+		u8 bounce_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+
+		memcpy(bounce_buf, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		__aes_arm_encrypt(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, bounce_buf,
+				  bounce_buf);
+		memcpy(out, bounce_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		return;
+	}
+	__aes_arm_encrypt(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, in, out);
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key,
+			     u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+			     const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+	    !IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)out | (uintptr_t)in, 4)) {
+		u8 bounce_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+
+		memcpy(bounce_buf, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		__aes_arm_decrypt(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds,
+				  bounce_buf, bounce_buf);
+		memcpy(out, bounce_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		return;
+	}
+	__aes_arm_decrypt(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds, in, out);
+}