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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c | 89 |
1 files changed, 89 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c b/lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9a7f31658 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crc/gen_crc32table.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <stdio.h> +#include "../../include/linux/crc32poly.h" +#include "../../include/generated/autoconf.h" +#include <inttypes.h> + +static uint32_t crc32table_le[256]; +static uint32_t crc32table_be[256]; +static uint32_t crc32ctable_le[256]; + +/** + * crc32init_le() - allocate and initialize LE table data + * + * crc is the crc of the byte i; other entries are filled in based on the + * fact that crctable[i^j] = crctable[i] ^ crctable[j]. + * + */ +static void crc32init_le_generic(const uint32_t polynomial, uint32_t tab[256]) +{ + unsigned i, j; + uint32_t crc = 1; + + tab[0] = 0; + + for (i = 128; i; i >>= 1) { + crc = (crc >> 1) ^ ((crc & 1) ? polynomial : 0); + for (j = 0; j < 256; j += 2 * i) + tab[i + j] = crc ^ tab[j]; + } +} + +static void crc32init_le(void) +{ + crc32init_le_generic(CRC32_POLY_LE, crc32table_le); +} + +static void crc32cinit_le(void) +{ + crc32init_le_generic(CRC32C_POLY_LE, crc32ctable_le); +} + +/** + * crc32init_be() - allocate and initialize BE table data + */ +static void crc32init_be(void) +{ + unsigned i, j; + uint32_t crc = 0x80000000; + + crc32table_be[0] = 0; + + for (i = 1; i < 256; i <<= 1) { + crc = (crc << 1) ^ ((crc & 0x80000000) ? CRC32_POLY_BE : 0); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + crc32table_be[i + j] = crc ^ crc32table_be[j]; + } +} + +static void output_table(const uint32_t table[256]) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) { + printf("\t0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x, 0x%08x,\n", + table[i], table[i + 1], table[i + 2], table[i + 3]); + } +} + +int main(int argc, char** argv) +{ + printf("/* this file is generated - do not edit */\n\n"); + + crc32init_le(); + printf("static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned crc32table_le[256] = {\n"); + output_table(crc32table_le); + printf("};\n"); + + crc32init_be(); + printf("static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned crc32table_be[256] = {\n"); + output_table(crc32table_be); + printf("};\n"); + + crc32cinit_le(); + printf("static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned crc32ctable_le[256] = {\n"); + output_table(crc32ctable_le); + printf("};\n"); + + return 0; +} |
