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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/bucket_locks.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/bucket_locks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/bucket_locks.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/bucket_locks.c b/lib/bucket_locks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d29516ca0 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/bucket_locks.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> + +/* Allocate an array of spinlocks to be accessed by a hash. Two arguments + * indicate the number of elements to allocate in the array. max_size + * gives the maximum number of elements to allocate. cpu_mult gives + * the number of locks per CPU to allocate. The size is rounded up + * to a power of 2 to be suitable as a hash table. + */ + +int __alloc_bucket_spinlocks(spinlock_t **locks, unsigned int *locks_mask, + size_t max_size, unsigned int cpu_mult, gfp_t gfp, + const char *name, struct lock_class_key *key) +{ + spinlock_t *tlocks = NULL; + unsigned int i, size; +#if defined(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) + unsigned int nr_pcpus = 2; +#else + unsigned int nr_pcpus = num_possible_cpus(); +#endif + + if (cpu_mult) { + nr_pcpus = min_t(unsigned int, nr_pcpus, 64UL); + size = min_t(unsigned int, nr_pcpus * cpu_mult, max_size); + } else { + size = max_size; + } + + if (sizeof(spinlock_t) != 0) { + tlocks = kvmalloc_objs(spinlock_t, size, gfp); + if (!tlocks) + return -ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + spin_lock_init(&tlocks[i]); + lockdep_init_map(&tlocks[i].dep_map, name, key, 0); + } + } + + *locks = tlocks; + *locks_mask = size - 1; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_bucket_spinlocks); + +void free_bucket_spinlocks(spinlock_t *locks) +{ + kvfree(locks); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_bucket_spinlocks); |
