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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/bucket_locks.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/bucket_locks.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/bucket_locks.c54
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/bucket_locks.c b/lib/bucket_locks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d29516ca0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/bucket_locks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+/* Allocate an array of spinlocks to be accessed by a hash. Two arguments
+ * indicate the number of elements to allocate in the array. max_size
+ * gives the maximum number of elements to allocate. cpu_mult gives
+ * the number of locks per CPU to allocate. The size is rounded up
+ * to a power of 2 to be suitable as a hash table.
+ */
+
+int __alloc_bucket_spinlocks(spinlock_t **locks, unsigned int *locks_mask,
+ size_t max_size, unsigned int cpu_mult, gfp_t gfp,
+ const char *name, struct lock_class_key *key)
+{
+ spinlock_t *tlocks = NULL;
+ unsigned int i, size;
+#if defined(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING)
+ unsigned int nr_pcpus = 2;
+#else
+ unsigned int nr_pcpus = num_possible_cpus();
+#endif
+
+ if (cpu_mult) {
+ nr_pcpus = min_t(unsigned int, nr_pcpus, 64UL);
+ size = min_t(unsigned int, nr_pcpus * cpu_mult, max_size);
+ } else {
+ size = max_size;
+ }
+
+ if (sizeof(spinlock_t) != 0) {
+ tlocks = kvmalloc_objs(spinlock_t, size, gfp);
+ if (!tlocks)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ spin_lock_init(&tlocks[i]);
+ lockdep_init_map(&tlocks[i].dep_map, name, key, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ *locks = tlocks;
+ *locks_mask = size - 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_bucket_spinlocks);
+
+void free_bucket_spinlocks(spinlock_t *locks)
+{
+ kvfree(locks);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_bucket_spinlocks);