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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/audit.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/audit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/audit.c | 89 |
1 files changed, 89 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/audit.c b/lib/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc07fbd3a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <asm/unistd.h> + +static unsigned dir_class[] = { +#include <asm-generic/audit_dir_write.h> +~0U +}; + +static unsigned read_class[] = { +#include <asm-generic/audit_read.h> +~0U +}; + +static unsigned write_class[] = { +#include <asm-generic/audit_write.h> +~0U +}; + +static unsigned chattr_class[] = { +#include <asm-generic/audit_change_attr.h> +~0U +}; + +static unsigned signal_class[] = { +#include <asm-generic/audit_signal.h> +~0U +}; + +int audit_classify_arch(int arch) +{ + if (audit_is_compat(arch)) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall) +{ + if (audit_is_compat(abi)) + return audit_classify_compat_syscall(abi, syscall); + + switch (syscall) { +#ifdef __NR_open + case __NR_open: + return AUDITSC_OPEN; +#endif +#ifdef __NR_openat + case __NR_openat: + return AUDITSC_OPENAT; +#endif +#ifdef __NR_socketcall + case __NR_socketcall: + return AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL; +#endif +#ifdef __NR_execveat + case __NR_execveat: +#endif + case __NR_execve: + return AUDITSC_EXECVE; +#ifdef __NR_openat2 + case __NR_openat2: + return AUDITSC_OPENAT2; +#endif + default: + return AUDITSC_NATIVE; + } +} + +static int __init audit_classes_init(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, compat_write_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, compat_read_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE_32, compat_dir_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, compat_chattr_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, compat_signal_class); +#endif + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, write_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, read_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE, dir_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, chattr_class); + audit_register_class(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, signal_class); + return 0; +} + +__initcall(audit_classes_init); |
