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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/argv_split.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/argv_split.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/argv_split.c | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/argv_split.c b/lib/argv_split.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e28db8e3b --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/argv_split.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Helper function for splitting a string into an argv-like array. + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/export.h> + +static int count_argc(const char *str) +{ + int count = 0; + bool was_space; + + for (was_space = true; *str; str++) { + if (isspace(*str)) { + was_space = true; + } else if (was_space) { + was_space = false; + count++; + } + } + + return count; +} + +/** + * argv_free - free an argv + * @argv: the argument vector to be freed + * + * Frees an argv and the strings it points to. + */ +void argv_free(char **argv) +{ + argv--; + kfree(argv[0]); + kfree(argv); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(argv_free); + +/** + * argv_split - split a string at whitespace, returning an argv + * @gfp: the GFP mask used to allocate memory + * @str: the string to be split + * @argcp: returned argument count + * + * Returns: an array of pointers to strings which are split out from + * @str. This is performed by strictly splitting on white-space; no + * quote processing is performed. Multiple whitespace characters are + * considered to be a single argument separator. The returned array + * is always NULL-terminated. Returns NULL on memory allocation + * failure. + * + * The source string at `str' may be undergoing concurrent alteration via + * userspace sysctl activity (at least). The argv_split() implementation + * attempts to handle this gracefully by taking a local copy to work on. + */ +char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp) +{ + char *argv_str; + bool was_space; + char **argv, **argv_ret; + int argc; + + argv_str = kstrndup(str, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE - 1, gfp); + if (!argv_str) + return NULL; + + argc = count_argc(argv_str); + argv = kmalloc_array(argc + 2, sizeof(*argv), gfp); + if (!argv) { + kfree(argv_str); + return NULL; + } + + *argv = argv_str; + argv_ret = ++argv; + for (was_space = true; *argv_str; argv_str++) { + if (isspace(*argv_str)) { + was_space = true; + *argv_str = 0; + } else if (was_space) { + was_space = false; + *argv++ = argv_str; + } + } + *argv = NULL; + + if (argcp) + *argcp = argc; + return argv_ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(argv_split); |
