diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /lib/argv_split.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/argv_split.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/argv_split.c | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/argv_split.c b/lib/argv_split.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e28db8e3b --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/argv_split.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Helper function for splitting a string into an argv-like array. + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/export.h> + +static int count_argc(const char *str) +{ + int count = 0; + bool was_space; + + for (was_space = true; *str; str++) { + if (isspace(*str)) { + was_space = true; + } else if (was_space) { + was_space = false; + count++; + } + } + + return count; +} + +/** + * argv_free - free an argv + * @argv: the argument vector to be freed + * + * Frees an argv and the strings it points to. + */ +void argv_free(char **argv) +{ + argv--; + kfree(argv[0]); + kfree(argv); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(argv_free); + +/** + * argv_split - split a string at whitespace, returning an argv + * @gfp: the GFP mask used to allocate memory + * @str: the string to be split + * @argcp: returned argument count + * + * Returns: an array of pointers to strings which are split out from + * @str. This is performed by strictly splitting on white-space; no + * quote processing is performed. Multiple whitespace characters are + * considered to be a single argument separator. The returned array + * is always NULL-terminated. Returns NULL on memory allocation + * failure. + * + * The source string at `str' may be undergoing concurrent alteration via + * userspace sysctl activity (at least). The argv_split() implementation + * attempts to handle this gracefully by taking a local copy to work on. + */ +char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp) +{ + char *argv_str; + bool was_space; + char **argv, **argv_ret; + int argc; + + argv_str = kstrndup(str, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE - 1, gfp); + if (!argv_str) + return NULL; + + argc = count_argc(argv_str); + argv = kmalloc_array(argc + 2, sizeof(*argv), gfp); + if (!argv) { + kfree(argv_str); + return NULL; + } + + *argv = argv_str; + argv_ret = ++argv; + for (was_space = true; *argv_str; argv_str++) { + if (isspace(*argv_str)) { + was_space = true; + *argv_str = 0; + } else if (was_space) { + was_space = false; + *argv++ = argv_str; + } + } + *argv = NULL; + + if (argcp) + *argcp = argc; + return argv_ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(argv_split); |
