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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/Kconfig.ubsan
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config ARCH_HAS_UBSAN
+ bool
+
+menuconfig UBSAN
+ bool "Undefined behaviour sanity checker"
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_UBSAN
+ help
+ This option enables the Undefined Behaviour sanity checker.
+ Compile-time instrumentation is used to detect various undefined
+ behaviours at runtime. For more details, see:
+ Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
+
+if UBSAN
+
+config UBSAN_TRAP
+ bool "Abort on Sanitizer warnings (smaller kernel but less verbose)"
+ depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+ help
+ Building kernels with Sanitizer features enabled tends to grow
+ the kernel size by around 5%, due to adding all the debugging
+ text on failure paths. To avoid this, Sanitizer instrumentation
+ can just issue a trap. This reduces the kernel size overhead but
+ turns all warnings (including potentially harmless conditions)
+ into full exceptions that abort the running kernel code
+ (regardless of context, locks held, etc), which may destabilize
+ the system. For some system builders this is an acceptable
+ trade-off.
+
+ Also note that selecting Y will cause your kernel to Oops
+ with an "illegal instruction" error with no further details
+ when a UBSAN violation occurs. (Except on arm64 and x86, which
+ will report which Sanitizer failed.) This may make it hard to
+ determine whether an Oops was caused by UBSAN or to figure
+ out the details of a UBSAN violation. It makes the kernel log
+ output less useful for bug reports.
+
+config CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize=bounds-strict)
+ help
+ The -fsanitize=bounds-strict option is only available on GCC,
+ but uses the more strict handling of arrays that includes knowledge
+ of flexible arrays, which is comparable to Clang's regular
+ -fsanitize=bounds.
+
+config CC_HAS_UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize=array-bounds)
+ help
+ Under Clang, the -fsanitize=bounds option is actually composed
+ of two more specific options, -fsanitize=array-bounds and
+ -fsanitize=local-bounds. However, -fsanitize=local-bounds can
+ only be used when trap mode is enabled. (See also the help for
+ CONFIG_LOCAL_BOUNDS.) Explicitly check for -fsanitize=array-bounds
+ so that we can build up the options needed for UBSAN_BOUNDS
+ with or without UBSAN_TRAP.
+
+config UBSAN_BOUNDS
+ bool "Perform array index bounds checking"
+ default UBSAN
+ depends on CC_HAS_UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS || CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT
+ help
+ This option enables detection of directly indexed out of bounds
+ array accesses, where the array size is known at compile time.
+ Note that this does not protect array overflows via bad calls
+ to the {str,mem}*cpy() family of functions (that is addressed
+ by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE).
+
+config UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT
+ def_bool UBSAN_BOUNDS && CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT
+ help
+ GCC's bounds sanitizer. This option is used to select the
+ correct options in Makefile.ubsan.
+
+config UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS
+ def_bool UBSAN_BOUNDS && CC_HAS_UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS
+ help
+ Clang's array bounds sanitizer. This option is used to select
+ the correct options in Makefile.ubsan.
+
+config UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS
+ def_bool UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS && UBSAN_TRAP
+ help
+ This option enables Clang's -fsanitize=local-bounds which traps
+ when an access through a pointer that is derived from an object
+ of a statically-known size, where an added offset (which may not
+ be known statically) is out-of-bounds. Since this option is
+ trap-only, it depends on CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP.
+
+config UBSAN_SHIFT
+ bool "Perform checking for bit-shift overflows"
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=shift)
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=shift which checks for bit-shift
+ operations that overflow to the left or go switch to negative
+ for signed types.
+
+config UBSAN_DIV_ZERO
+ bool "Perform checking for integer divide-by-zero"
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero)
+ # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1657
+ # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/56289
+ depends on !CC_IS_CLANG
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero which checks
+ for integer division by zero. This is effectively redundant with the
+ kernel's existing exception handling, though it can provide greater
+ debugging information.
+
+config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
+ bool "Perform checking for unreachable code"
+ # objtool already handles unreachable checking and gets angry about
+ # seeing UBSan instrumentation located in unreachable places.
+ depends on !(OBJTOOL && (STACK_VALIDATION || UNWINDER_ORC || HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION))
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unreachable)
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control
+ flow reaching an expected-to-be-unreachable position.
+
+config UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP
+ bool "Perform checking for integer arithmetic wrap-around"
+ # This is very experimental so drop the next line if you really want it
+ depends on BROKEN
+ depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-undefined-ignore-overflow-pattern=all)
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=implicit-signed-integer-truncation)
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=implicit-unsigned-integer-truncation)
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize-ignorelist=/dev/null)
+ help
+ This option enables all of the sanitizers involved in integer overflow
+ (wrap-around) mitigation: signed-integer-overflow, unsigned-integer-overflow,
+ implicit-signed-integer-truncation, and implicit-unsigned-integer-truncation.
+ This is currently limited only to the size_t type while testing and
+ compiler development continues.
+
+config UBSAN_BOOL
+ bool "Perform checking for non-boolean values used as boolean"
+ default UBSAN
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=bool)
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=bool which checks for boolean values being
+ loaded that are neither 0 nor 1.
+
+config UBSAN_ENUM
+ bool "Perform checking for out of bounds enum values"
+ default UBSAN
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=enum)
+ help
+ This option enables -fsanitize=enum which checks for values being loaded
+ into an enum that are outside the range of given values for the given enum.
+
+config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
+ bool "Perform checking for misaligned pointer usage"
+ default !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+ depends on !UBSAN_TRAP && !COMPILE_TEST
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=alignment)
+ help
+ This option enables the check of unaligned memory accesses.
+ Enabling this option on architectures that support unaligned
+ accesses may produce a lot of false positives.
+
+config TEST_UBSAN
+ tristate "Module for testing for undefined behavior detection"
+ depends on m
+ help
+ This is a test module for UBSAN.
+ It triggers various undefined behavior, and detect it.
+
+config UBSAN_KVM_EL2
+ bool "UBSAN for KVM code at EL2"
+ depends on ARM64
+ help
+ Enable UBSAN when running on ARM64 with KVM in a split mode
+ (nvhe/hvhe/protected) for the hypervisor code running in EL2.
+ In this mode, any UBSAN violation in EL2 would panic the kernel
+ and information similar to UBSAN_TRAP would be printed.
+
+endif # if UBSAN