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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /lib/842/842_debugfs.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/842/842_debugfs.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/842/842_debugfs.h | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/842/842_debugfs.h b/lib/842/842_debugfs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4469407c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/842/842_debugfs.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef __842_DEBUGFS_H__ +#define __842_DEBUGFS_H__ + +#include <linux/debugfs.h> + +static bool sw842_template_counts; +module_param_named(template_counts, sw842_template_counts, bool, 0444); + +static atomic_t template_count[OPS_MAX], template_repeat_count, + template_zeros_count, template_short_data_count, template_end_count; + +static struct dentry *sw842_debugfs_root; + +static int __init sw842_debugfs_create(void) +{ + umode_t m = S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR; + int i; + + if (!debugfs_initialized()) + return -ENODEV; + + sw842_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir(MODULE_NAME, NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(template_count); i++) { + char name[32]; + + snprintf(name, 32, "template_%02x", i); + debugfs_create_atomic_t(name, m, sw842_debugfs_root, + &template_count[i]); + } + debugfs_create_atomic_t("template_repeat", m, sw842_debugfs_root, + &template_repeat_count); + debugfs_create_atomic_t("template_zeros", m, sw842_debugfs_root, + &template_zeros_count); + debugfs_create_atomic_t("template_short_data", m, sw842_debugfs_root, + &template_short_data_count); + debugfs_create_atomic_t("template_end", m, sw842_debugfs_root, + &template_end_count); + + return 0; +} + +static void __exit sw842_debugfs_remove(void) +{ + debugfs_remove_recursive(sw842_debugfs_root); +} + +#endif |
