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| author | Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> | 2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200 |
| commit | a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch) | |
| tree | 73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /io_uring/xattr.c | |
| download | linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip | |
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.
The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:
<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi
Which triggers this crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230
Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.
The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.
During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.
Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/xattr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/xattr.c | 197 |
1 files changed, 197 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/xattr.c b/io_uring/xattr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5303df3f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/xattr.c @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/io_uring.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> + +#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h> + +#include "../fs/internal.h" + +#include "io_uring.h" +#include "xattr.h" + +struct io_xattr { + struct file *file; + struct kernel_xattr_ctx ctx; + struct delayed_filename filename; +}; + +void io_xattr_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + + dismiss_delayed_filename(&ix->filename); + kfree(ix->ctx.kname); + kvfree(ix->ctx.kvalue); +} + +static void io_xattr_finish(struct io_kiocb *req, int ret) +{ + req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + + io_xattr_cleanup(req); + io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0); +} + +static int __io_getxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, + const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + const char __user *name; + int ret; + + INIT_DELAYED_FILENAME(&ix->filename); + ix->ctx.kvalue = NULL; + name = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr)); + ix->ctx.value = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr2)); + ix->ctx.size = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); + ix->ctx.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->xattr_flags); + + if (ix->ctx.flags) + return -EINVAL; + + ix->ctx.kname = kmalloc_obj(*ix->ctx.kname); + if (!ix->ctx.kname) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = import_xattr_name(ix->ctx.kname, name); + if (ret) { + kfree(ix->ctx.kname); + return ret; + } + + req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC; + return 0; +} + +int io_fgetxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + return __io_getxattr_prep(req, sqe); +} + +int io_getxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + const char __user *path; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE)) + return -EBADF; + + ret = __io_getxattr_prep(req, sqe); + if (ret) + return ret; + + path = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr3)); + + return delayed_getname(&ix->filename, path); +} + +int io_fgetxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + ret = file_getxattr(req->file, &ix->ctx); + io_xattr_finish(req, ret); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} + +int io_getxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + CLASS(filename_complete_delayed, name)(&ix->filename); + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + ret = filename_getxattr(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &ix->ctx); + io_xattr_finish(req, ret); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} + +static int __io_setxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, + const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + const char __user *name; + int ret; + + INIT_DELAYED_FILENAME(&ix->filename); + name = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr)); + ix->ctx.cvalue = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr2)); + ix->ctx.kvalue = NULL; + ix->ctx.size = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); + ix->ctx.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->xattr_flags); + + ix->ctx.kname = kmalloc_obj(*ix->ctx.kname); + if (!ix->ctx.kname) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = setxattr_copy(name, &ix->ctx); + if (ret) { + kfree(ix->ctx.kname); + return ret; + } + + req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC; + return 0; +} + +int io_setxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + const char __user *path; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE)) + return -EBADF; + + ret = __io_setxattr_prep(req, sqe); + if (ret) + return ret; + + path = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr3)); + + return delayed_getname(&ix->filename, path); +} + +int io_fsetxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + return __io_setxattr_prep(req, sqe); +} + +int io_fsetxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + ret = file_setxattr(req->file, &ix->ctx); + io_xattr_finish(req, ret); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} + +int io_setxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr); + CLASS(filename_complete_delayed, name)(&ix->filename); + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + ret = filename_setxattr(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &ix->ctx); + io_xattr_finish(req, ret); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} |
