openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 197 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/xattr.c b/io_uring/xattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5303df3f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/xattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include "../fs/internal.h"
+
+#include "io_uring.h"
+#include "xattr.h"
+
+struct io_xattr {
+	struct file			*file;
+	struct kernel_xattr_ctx		ctx;
+	struct delayed_filename		filename;
+};
+
+void io_xattr_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+
+	dismiss_delayed_filename(&ix->filename);
+	kfree(ix->ctx.kname);
+	kvfree(ix->ctx.kvalue);
+}
+
+static void io_xattr_finish(struct io_kiocb *req, int ret)
+{
+	req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP;
+
+	io_xattr_cleanup(req);
+	io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0);
+}
+
+static int __io_getxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req,
+			      const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	const char __user *name;
+	int ret;
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_FILENAME(&ix->filename);
+	ix->ctx.kvalue = NULL;
+	name = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
+	ix->ctx.value = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr2));
+	ix->ctx.size = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	ix->ctx.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->xattr_flags);
+
+	if (ix->ctx.flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ix->ctx.kname = kmalloc_obj(*ix->ctx.kname);
+	if (!ix->ctx.kname)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = import_xattr_name(ix->ctx.kname, name);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(ix->ctx.kname);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP;
+	req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int io_fgetxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	return __io_getxattr_prep(req, sqe);
+}
+
+int io_getxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	const char __user *path;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (unlikely(req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	ret = __io_getxattr_prep(req, sqe);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	path = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr3));
+
+	return delayed_getname(&ix->filename, path);
+}
+
+int io_fgetxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+	ret = file_getxattr(req->file, &ix->ctx);
+	io_xattr_finish(req, ret);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+int io_getxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	CLASS(filename_complete_delayed, name)(&ix->filename);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+	ret = filename_getxattr(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &ix->ctx);
+	io_xattr_finish(req, ret);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static int __io_setxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req,
+			const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	const char __user *name;
+	int ret;
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_FILENAME(&ix->filename);
+	name = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr));
+	ix->ctx.cvalue = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr2));
+	ix->ctx.kvalue = NULL;
+	ix->ctx.size = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
+	ix->ctx.flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->xattr_flags);
+
+	ix->ctx.kname = kmalloc_obj(*ix->ctx.kname);
+	if (!ix->ctx.kname)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = setxattr_copy(name, &ix->ctx);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(ix->ctx.kname);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP;
+	req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int io_setxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	const char __user *path;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (unlikely(req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	ret = __io_setxattr_prep(req, sqe);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	path = u64_to_user_ptr(READ_ONCE(sqe->addr3));
+
+	return delayed_getname(&ix->filename, path);
+}
+
+int io_fsetxattr_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
+{
+	return __io_setxattr_prep(req, sqe);
+}
+
+int io_fsetxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+	ret = file_setxattr(req->file, &ix->ctx);
+	io_xattr_finish(req, ret);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+int io_setxattr(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	struct io_xattr *ix = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_xattr);
+	CLASS(filename_complete_delayed, name)(&ix->filename);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+	ret = filename_setxattr(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &ix->ctx);
+	io_xattr_finish(req, ret);
+	return IOU_COMPLETE;
+}