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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/wait.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/wait.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/wait.h | 55 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/wait.h b/io_uring/wait.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7b9c46b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/wait.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef IOU_WAIT_H +#define IOU_WAIT_H + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> + +/* + * ->cq_wait_nr is armed with the number of lazy task_work adds the waiter + * still needs, and counted down by the add side, with the add reaching zero + * issuing the (single) wake up for this wait cycle. Zero and below means no + * wake up is to be issued: IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT when no task is waiting (also + * what a forced wake up resets it to when claiming one), zero once the + * countdown has fired. + */ +#define IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT (-1) + +struct ext_arg { + size_t argsz; + struct timespec64 ts; + const sigset_t __user *sig; + ktime_t min_time; + bool ts_set; + bool iowait; +}; + +int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, u32 flags, + struct ext_arg *ext_arg); +int io_run_task_work_sig(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_cqring_do_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_cqring_overflow_flush_locked(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); + +static inline unsigned int __io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_rings *rings = io_get_rings(ctx); + return ctx->cached_cq_tail - READ_ONCE(rings->cq.head); +} + +static inline unsigned int __io_cqring_events_user(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_rings *rings = io_get_rings(ctx); + + return READ_ONCE(rings->cq.tail) - READ_ONCE(rings->cq.head); +} + +/* + * Reads the tail/head of the CQ ring while providing an acquire ordering, + * see comment at top of io_uring.c. + */ +static inline unsigned io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + smp_rmb(); + return __io_cqring_events(ctx); +} + +#endif |
