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| author | Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> | 2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200 |
| commit | a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch) | |
| tree | 73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /io_uring/wait.h | |
| download | linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip | |
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.
The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:
<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi
Which triggers this crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230
Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.
The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.
During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.
Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/wait.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/wait.h | 55 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/wait.h b/io_uring/wait.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7b9c46b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/wait.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef IOU_WAIT_H +#define IOU_WAIT_H + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> + +/* + * ->cq_wait_nr is armed with the number of lazy task_work adds the waiter + * still needs, and counted down by the add side, with the add reaching zero + * issuing the (single) wake up for this wait cycle. Zero and below means no + * wake up is to be issued: IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT when no task is waiting (also + * what a forced wake up resets it to when claiming one), zero once the + * countdown has fired. + */ +#define IO_CQ_WAKE_INIT (-1) + +struct ext_arg { + size_t argsz; + struct timespec64 ts; + const sigset_t __user *sig; + ktime_t min_time; + bool ts_set; + bool iowait; +}; + +int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int min_events, u32 flags, + struct ext_arg *ext_arg); +int io_run_task_work_sig(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_cqring_do_overflow_flush(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_cqring_overflow_flush_locked(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); + +static inline unsigned int __io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_rings *rings = io_get_rings(ctx); + return ctx->cached_cq_tail - READ_ONCE(rings->cq.head); +} + +static inline unsigned int __io_cqring_events_user(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_rings *rings = io_get_rings(ctx); + + return READ_ONCE(rings->cq.tail) - READ_ONCE(rings->cq.head); +} + +/* + * Reads the tail/head of the CQ ring while providing an acquire ordering, + * see comment at top of io_uring.c. + */ +static inline unsigned io_cqring_events(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + smp_rmb(); + return __io_cqring_events(ctx); +} + +#endif |
