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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/uring_cmd.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/uring_cmd.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/uring_cmd.h26
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.h b/io_uring/uring_cmd.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..041aef8a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+struct io_async_cmd {
+ struct iou_vec vec;
+ struct io_uring_sqe sqes[2];
+};
+
+int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_uring_cmd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+void io_uring_cmd_sqe_copy(struct io_kiocb *req);
+void io_uring_cmd_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req);
+
+bool io_uring_try_cancel_uring_cmd(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+ struct io_uring_task *tctx, bool cancel_all);
+
+bool io_uring_cmd_post_mshot_cqe32(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags,
+ struct io_uring_cqe cqe[2]);
+
+void io_cmd_cache_free(const void *entry);
+
+int io_cmd_poll_multishot(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd,
+ unsigned int issue_flags, __poll_t mask);