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| author | Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> | 2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200 |
| commit | a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch) | |
| tree | 73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /io_uring/tctx.h | |
| download | linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip | |
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.
The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:
<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi
Which triggers this crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230
Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.
The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.
During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.
Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/tctx.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/tctx.h | 34 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/tctx.h b/io_uring/tctx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..76ad1ad45 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/tctx.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +struct io_tctx_node { + struct list_head ctx_node; + struct task_struct *task; + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx; +}; + +struct io_uring_task *io_uring_alloc_task_context(struct task_struct *task, + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_uring_del_tctx_node(unsigned long index); +int __io_uring_add_tctx_node(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +int __io_uring_add_tctx_node_from_submit(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_uring_clean_tctx(struct io_uring_task *tctx); +void io_uring_free_tctx(struct task_struct *tsk); + +void io_uring_unreg_ringfd(void); +int io_ringfd_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *__arg, + unsigned nr_args); +int io_ringfd_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *__arg, + unsigned nr_args); + +/* + * Note that this task has used io_uring. We use it for cancelation purposes. + */ +static inline int io_uring_add_tctx_node(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; + + if (likely(tctx && tctx->last == ctx)) + return 0; + + return __io_uring_add_tctx_node_from_submit(ctx); +} |
