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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/tctx.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/tctx.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/tctx.h | 34 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/tctx.h b/io_uring/tctx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..76ad1ad45 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/tctx.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +struct io_tctx_node { + struct list_head ctx_node; + struct task_struct *task; + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx; +}; + +struct io_uring_task *io_uring_alloc_task_context(struct task_struct *task, + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_uring_del_tctx_node(unsigned long index); +int __io_uring_add_tctx_node(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +int __io_uring_add_tctx_node_from_submit(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_uring_clean_tctx(struct io_uring_task *tctx); +void io_uring_free_tctx(struct task_struct *tsk); + +void io_uring_unreg_ringfd(void); +int io_ringfd_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *__arg, + unsigned nr_args); +int io_ringfd_unregister(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *__arg, + unsigned nr_args); + +/* + * Note that this task has used io_uring. We use it for cancelation purposes. + */ +static inline int io_uring_add_tctx_node(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; + + if (likely(tctx && tctx->last == ctx)) + return 0; + + return __io_uring_add_tctx_node_from_submit(ctx); +} |
