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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/splice.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/splice.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/splice.c | 149 |
1 files changed, 149 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/splice.c b/io_uring/splice.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e81ebbb91 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/splice.c @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/io_uring.h> +#include <linux/splice.h> + +#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h> + +#include "filetable.h" +#include "io_uring.h" +#include "splice.h" + +struct io_splice { + struct file *file_out; + loff_t off_out; + loff_t off_in; + u64 len; + int splice_fd_in; + unsigned int flags; + struct io_rsrc_node *rsrc_node; +}; + +static int __io_splice_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, + const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + unsigned int valid_flags = SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED | SPLICE_F_ALL; + + sp->len = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); + sp->flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->splice_flags); + if (unlikely(sp->flags & ~valid_flags)) + return -EINVAL; + sp->splice_fd_in = READ_ONCE(sqe->splice_fd_in); + sp->rsrc_node = NULL; + req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC; + return 0; +} + +int io_tee_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + if (READ_ONCE(sqe->splice_off_in) || READ_ONCE(sqe->off)) + return -EINVAL; + return __io_splice_prep(req, sqe); +} + +void io_splice_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + + if (sp->rsrc_node) + io_put_rsrc_node(req->ctx, sp->rsrc_node); +} + +static struct file *io_splice_get_file(struct io_kiocb *req, + unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; + struct io_rsrc_node *node; + struct file *file = NULL; + + if (!(sp->flags & SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED)) + return io_file_get_normal(req, sp->splice_fd_in); + + io_ring_submit_lock(ctx, issue_flags); + node = io_rsrc_node_lookup(&ctx->file_table.data, sp->splice_fd_in); + if (node) { + node->refs++; + sp->rsrc_node = node; + file = io_slot_file(node); + req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; + } + io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags); + return file; +} + +int io_tee(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + struct file *out = sp->file_out; + unsigned int flags = sp->flags & ~SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED; + struct file *in; + ssize_t ret = 0; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + in = io_splice_get_file(req, issue_flags); + if (!in) { + ret = -EBADF; + goto done; + } + + if (sp->len) + ret = do_tee(in, out, sp->len, flags); + + if (!(sp->flags & SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED)) + fput(in); +done: + if (ret != sp->len) + req_set_fail(req); + io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} + +int io_splice_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + + sp->off_in = READ_ONCE(sqe->splice_off_in); + sp->off_out = READ_ONCE(sqe->off); + return __io_splice_prep(req, sqe); +} + +int io_splice(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) +{ + struct io_splice *sp = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_splice); + struct file *out = sp->file_out; + unsigned int flags = sp->flags & ~SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED; + loff_t *poff_in, *poff_out; + struct file *in; + ssize_t ret = 0; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(issue_flags & IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK); + + in = io_splice_get_file(req, issue_flags); + if (!in) { + ret = -EBADF; + goto done; + } + + poff_in = (sp->off_in == -1) ? NULL : &sp->off_in; + poff_out = (sp->off_out == -1) ? NULL : &sp->off_out; + + if (sp->len) + ret = do_splice(in, poff_in, out, poff_out, sp->len, flags); + + if (!(sp->flags & SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED)) + fput(in); +done: + if (ret != sp->len) + req_set_fail(req); + io_req_set_res(req, ret, 0); + return IOU_COMPLETE; +} |
