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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/rw.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/rw.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/rw.h | 53 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/rw.h b/io_uring/rw.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1179506f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/rw.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/io_uring_types.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> + +struct io_meta_state { + u32 seed; + struct iov_iter_state iter_meta; +}; + +struct io_async_rw { + struct iou_vec vec; + size_t bytes_done; + + struct_group(clear, + struct iov_iter iter; + struct iov_iter_state iter_state; + struct iovec fast_iov; + unsigned buf_group; + + /* + * wpq is for buffered io, while meta fields are used with + * direct io + */ + union { + struct wait_page_queue wpq; + struct { + struct uio_meta meta; + struct io_meta_state meta_state; + }; + }; + ); +}; + +int io_prep_read_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_write_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_readv_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_writev_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_readv(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_writev(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_read(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_prep_write(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); +int io_write(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); +int io_read_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); +int io_write_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); +void io_readv_writev_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req); +void io_rw_fail(struct io_kiocb *req); +void io_req_rw_complete(struct io_tw_req tw_req, io_tw_token_t tw); +int io_read_mshot_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe); +int io_read_mshot(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags); +void io_rw_cache_free(const void *entry); |
