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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/rw.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/rw.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/rw.h53
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/rw.h b/io_uring/rw.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1179506f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/rw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+
+struct io_meta_state {
+ u32 seed;
+ struct iov_iter_state iter_meta;
+};
+
+struct io_async_rw {
+ struct iou_vec vec;
+ size_t bytes_done;
+
+ struct_group(clear,
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iov_iter_state iter_state;
+ struct iovec fast_iov;
+ unsigned buf_group;
+
+ /*
+ * wpq is for buffered io, while meta fields are used with
+ * direct io
+ */
+ union {
+ struct wait_page_queue wpq;
+ struct {
+ struct uio_meta meta;
+ struct io_meta_state meta_state;
+ };
+ };
+ );
+};
+
+int io_prep_read_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_write_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_readv_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_writev_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_readv(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_writev(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_read(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_prep_write(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_write(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_read_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_write_fixed(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+void io_readv_writev_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req);
+void io_rw_fail(struct io_kiocb *req);
+void io_req_rw_complete(struct io_tw_req tw_req, io_tw_token_t tw);
+int io_read_mshot_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_read_mshot(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+void io_rw_cache_free(const void *entry);