ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted

When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().

If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.

Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.

For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.

Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.

Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>

Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/refs.h b/io_uring/refs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0fe16b67c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/refs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef IOU_REQ_REF_H
+#define IOU_REQ_REF_H
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Shamelessly stolen from the mm implementation of page reference checking,
+ * see commit f958d7b528b1 for details.
+ */
+#define req_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(req)	\
+	((unsigned int) atomic_read(&(req->refs)) + 127u <= 127u)
+
+static inline bool req_ref_inc_not_zero(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT));
+	return atomic_inc_not_zero(&req->refs);
+}
+
+static inline bool req_ref_put_and_test_atomic(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(data_race(req->flags) & REQ_F_REFCOUNT));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(req_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(req));
+	return atomic_dec_and_test(&req->refs);
+}
+
+static inline bool req_ref_put_and_test(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	if (likely(!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT)))
+		return true;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(req_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(req));
+	return atomic_dec_and_test(&req->refs);
+}
+
+static inline void req_ref_get(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(req_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(req));
+	atomic_inc(&req->refs);
+}
+
+static inline void req_ref_put(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(req_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(req));
+	atomic_dec(&req->refs);
+}
+
+static inline void __io_req_set_refcount(struct io_kiocb *req, int nr)
+{
+	if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT)) {
+		req->flags |= REQ_F_REFCOUNT;
+		atomic_set(&req->refs, nr);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void io_req_set_refcount(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	__io_req_set_refcount(req, 1);
+}
+#endif