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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /io_uring/poll.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/poll.h')
-rw-r--r--io_uring/poll.h49
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/poll.h b/io_uring/poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5647c5138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+#define IO_POLL_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX 32
+
+enum {
+ IO_APOLL_OK,
+ IO_APOLL_ABORTED,
+ IO_APOLL_READY
+};
+
+struct io_poll {
+ struct file *file;
+ struct wait_queue_head *head;
+ __poll_t events;
+ int retries;
+ struct wait_queue_entry wait;
+};
+
+struct async_poll {
+ struct io_poll poll;
+ struct io_poll *double_poll;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Must only be called inside issue_flags & IO_URING_F_MULTISHOT, or
+ * potentially other cases where we already "own" this poll request.
+ */
+static inline void io_poll_multishot_retry(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+ atomic_inc(&req->poll_refs);
+}
+
+int io_poll_add_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_poll_add(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_poll_remove_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_poll_remove(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+struct io_cancel_data;
+int io_poll_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+ unsigned issue_flags);
+int io_arm_apoll(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags, __poll_t mask);
+int io_arm_poll_handler(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags);
+bool io_poll_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+ bool cancel_all);
+
+void io_poll_task_func(struct io_tw_req tw_req, io_tw_token_t tw);