ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted

When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().

If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.

Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.

For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.

Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.

Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>

Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/poll.h b/io_uring/poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5647c5138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+
+#define IO_POLL_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX 32
+
+enum {
+	IO_APOLL_OK,
+	IO_APOLL_ABORTED,
+	IO_APOLL_READY
+};
+
+struct io_poll {
+	struct file			*file;
+	struct wait_queue_head		*head;
+	__poll_t			events;
+	int				retries;
+	struct wait_queue_entry		wait;
+};
+
+struct async_poll {
+	struct io_poll		poll;
+	struct io_poll		*double_poll;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Must only be called inside issue_flags & IO_URING_F_MULTISHOT, or
+ * potentially other cases where we already "own" this poll request.
+ */
+static inline void io_poll_multishot_retry(struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&req->poll_refs);
+}
+
+int io_poll_add_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_poll_add(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_poll_remove_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_poll_remove(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+struct io_cancel_data;
+int io_poll_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_cancel_data *cd,
+		   unsigned issue_flags);
+int io_arm_apoll(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags, __poll_t mask);
+int io_arm_poll_handler(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags);
+bool io_poll_remove_all(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_uring_task *tctx,
+			bool cancel_all);
+
+void io_poll_task_func(struct io_tw_req tw_req, io_tw_token_t tw);