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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/opdef.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/opdef.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/opdef.h | 58 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/opdef.h b/io_uring/opdef.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..667f981e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/opdef.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef IOU_OP_DEF_H +#define IOU_OP_DEF_H + +struct io_uring_bpf_ctx; + +struct io_issue_def { + /* needs req->file assigned */ + unsigned needs_file : 1; + /* should block plug */ + unsigned plug : 1; + /* supports ioprio */ + unsigned ioprio : 1; + /* supports iopoll */ + unsigned iopoll : 1; + /* op supports buffer selection */ + unsigned buffer_select : 1; + /* hash wq insertion if file is a regular file */ + unsigned hash_reg_file : 1; + /* unbound wq insertion if file is a non-regular file */ + unsigned unbound_nonreg_file : 1; + /* set if opcode supports polled "wait" */ + unsigned pollin : 1; + unsigned pollout : 1; + unsigned poll_exclusive : 1; + /* skip auditing */ + unsigned audit_skip : 1; + /* vectored opcode, set if 1) vectored, and 2) handler needs to know */ + unsigned vectored : 1; + /* set to 1 if this opcode uses 128b sqes in a mixed sq */ + unsigned is_128 : 1; + + /* size of async data needed, if any */ + unsigned short async_size; + + /* bpf filter pdu size, if any */ + unsigned short filter_pdu_size; + + int (*issue)(struct io_kiocb *, unsigned int); + int (*prep)(struct io_kiocb *, const struct io_uring_sqe *); + void (*filter_populate)(struct io_uring_bpf_ctx *, struct io_kiocb *); +}; + +struct io_cold_def { + const char *name; + + void (*sqe_copy)(struct io_kiocb *); + void (*cleanup)(struct io_kiocb *); + void (*fail)(struct io_kiocb *); +}; + +extern const struct io_issue_def io_issue_defs[]; +extern const struct io_cold_def io_cold_defs[]; + +bool io_uring_op_supported(u8 opcode); + +void io_uring_optable_init(void); +#endif |
