staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/net.h b/io_uring/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51fda715d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/io_uring/bpf_filter.h>
+
+struct io_async_msghdr {
+#if defined(CONFIG_NET)
+	struct iou_vec				vec;
+
+	struct_group(clear,
+		int				namelen;
+		struct iovec			fast_iov;
+		__kernel_size_t			controllen;
+		__kernel_size_t			payloadlen;
+		struct sockaddr __user		*uaddr;
+		struct msghdr			msg;
+		struct sockaddr_storage		addr;
+	);
+#else
+	struct_group(clear);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_NET)
+
+int io_shutdown_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_shutdown(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+void io_sendmsg_recvmsg_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req);
+int io_sendmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_sendmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_send(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_recvmsg(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_recv(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+void io_sendrecv_fail(struct io_kiocb *req);
+
+int io_accept_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_accept(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_socket_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_socket(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+void io_socket_bpf_populate(struct io_uring_bpf_ctx *bctx, struct io_kiocb *req);
+void io_connect_bpf_populate(struct io_uring_bpf_ctx *bctx, struct io_kiocb *req);
+
+int io_connect_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_connect(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_sendmsg_zc(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+int io_send_zc_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+void io_send_zc_cleanup(struct io_kiocb *req);
+
+int io_bind_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_bind(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+int io_listen_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);
+int io_listen(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
+
+void io_netmsg_cache_free(const void *entry);
+#else
+static inline void io_netmsg_cache_free(const void *entry)
+{
+}
+static inline void io_socket_bpf_populate(struct io_uring_bpf_ctx *bctx,
+					  struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void io_connect_bpf_populate(struct io_uring_bpf_ctx *bctx,
+					   struct io_kiocb *req)
+{
+}
+
+#endif