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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /io_uring/memmap.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring/memmap.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/memmap.h | 52 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/memmap.h b/io_uring/memmap.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f4cfbb6b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/memmap.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef IO_URING_MEMMAP_H +#define IO_URING_MEMMAP_H + +#define IORING_MAP_OFF_PARAM_REGION 0x20000000ULL +#define IORING_MAP_OFF_ZCRX_REGION 0x30000000ULL + +#define IORING_OFF_ZCRX_SHIFT 16 + +struct page **io_pin_pages(unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long len, int *npages); + +#ifndef CONFIG_MMU +unsigned int io_uring_nommu_mmap_capabilities(struct file *file); +#endif +unsigned long io_uring_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, + unsigned long flags); +int io_uring_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +void io_free_region(struct user_struct *user, struct io_mapped_region *mr); +int io_create_region(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_mapped_region *mr, + struct io_uring_region_desc *reg, + unsigned long mmap_offset); + +static inline void *io_region_get_ptr(struct io_mapped_region *mr) +{ + return mr->ptr; +} + +static inline bool io_region_is_set(struct io_mapped_region *mr) +{ + return !!mr->nr_pages; +} + +static inline void io_region_publish(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, + struct io_mapped_region *src_region, + struct io_mapped_region *dst_region) +{ + /* + * Once published mmap can find it without holding only the ->mmap_lock + * and not ->uring_lock. + */ + guard(mutex)(&ctx->mmap_lock); + *dst_region = *src_region; +} + +static inline size_t io_region_size(struct io_mapped_region *mr) +{ + return (size_t) mr->nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; +} + +#endif |
